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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
NATASHA HAWLEY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 20000738-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) provides this Court's jurisdiction over this 
case involving convictions of one third degree felony and one class B misdemeanor 
entered in a court of record. 
ISSUES. STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION 
1. Should the trial court have disqualified himself because the defendant 
routinely acts an officer of his Court? 
This issue is reviewed for correctness. State v. Alonzo, 973 P.2d 975 (Utah 
1999). 
This issue was preserved by pretrial motion (R. 20-25). 
Because the lower court found that the motion was not timely filed, Hawley 
asserts the plain error, ineffective assistance of counsel, and exceptional circumstances 
doctrines in raising the issue. 
2. Did the trial court err in admitting Hawley's refusal to submit to a breath 
test? 
This issue turns on statutory interpretation, which is reviewed for 
correctness. Cf., e.g., Stephens v. Bonneville Travel Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 519 (Utah 
1997). 
This issue was preserved by pretrial motion (R. 44-47). 
3. Was the evidence sufficient to sustain the third degree felony 
conviction? 
Because the relevant portion of the case was tried to the bench, this Court 
will determine if the trial court's verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence. See, 
e.g.. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). To the extent possible, Hawley 
will marshal the evidence which supports the trial court's findings, and prove why, as a 
matter of law, the verdict was incorrect. See, e.g.. State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 819 
(UtahApp. 1994). 
This issue was preserved by pretrial motion and by argument at sentencing 
(R. 107-114; R. 133 at 35; R. 134 at 4). 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The language of the following statutes and rules is at issue, and these 
provisions appear in Addendum 1 to this brief: Colorado Revised Statutes § 42-4-1031; 
Utah Code Ann. §§41 -6-44 (1999), 41 -6-44.6 (1999); 41 -6-44.10(1999); 41 -6-45 
(1999); Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 (pre-November 1999 amended version); 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 (2000); Utah Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION 
On January 28, 2000, the State charged Ms. Hawley with one count of 
driving under the influence, a third degree felony, and with one count of leaving the 
scene of an accident, a class B misdemeanor (R. 1-2). 
Thirteen days prior to the preliminary hearing, on April 6, 2000, Hawley 
moved to disqualify Judge Lyle R. Anderson from the case, because she was an attorney 
who routinely appeared as an officer of his court (R. 20-25). 
Judge Anderson certified the matter to Presiding Judge Scott N. Johansen 
for his review (R. 26). 
Judge Johansen denied the motion to disqualify on the ground that it was 
not timely filed but was for purposes of delay, ruling that the bases for the motion were 
or should have been known to Hawley and counsel from the beginning of the case, and 
that the motion should have been filed at the latest by March 6, 2000 (R. 28). 
Judge Anderson presided over the preliminary hearing, bound Hawley over 
for trial, and took her not guilty pleas at arraignment (R. 34-35). 
Prior to trial, Hawley moved to exclude evidence of her refusal to take a 
chemical test because a refusal had not been found by administrative hearing, as required 
by Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (R. 44-47). The prosecutor opposed the motion and 
while Judge Anderson found the issue was not frivolous, he admitted the refusal 
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evidence (R. 133 at 37-38). 
The jury convicted Hawley of DUI and leaving the scene of an accident (R. 
103). 
Prior to sentencing, Hawley submitted a memorandum asserting her right to 
a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt on the issue of whether the DUI 
conviction should enter as a third degree felony on the basis of prior convictions (R. 107-
114). Hawley waived her right to a jury's determination, but preserved the issue about 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt (R. 133 at 35; R. 134 at 4). 
The prosecutor conceded that he had to prove the prior convictions beyond 
a reasonable doubt (R. 134 at 4). 
In support of the third degree felony conviction, the prosecutor submitted 
four documents (R. 134 at 4-5). 
The trial court found that three of the judgments sustained the third degree 
conviction (R. 134 at 11-14). 
The court sentenced Hawley to a term of zero to five years in the Utah State 
Prison and six months in jail, to run concurrently, and then suspended that sentence, 
granting Hawley probation including one hundred and eighty days in jail and thirty-six 
months of supervision by Adult Probation and Parole (R. 117-119). The court also 
ordered Hawley to complete an in-patient alcohol program upon her release from jail, 
fined Hawley $1,850, and suspended Hawley's driver's license for one year (R. 118, 
4 
123). 
The court signed the judgment on August 2, 2000 (R. 124). 
Counsel filed a timely notice of appeal on August 2 U 2000 (R. 126). 
RELEVANT FACTS 
Prosecution Case 
On the evening of January 27, 2000, Kristina Jim was passing through 
Moab on her way from her work in Superior Wyoming to her home in Farmington, New 
Mexico (R. 133 at 49). 
Jim was parked at the Maverick station getting gas, when Ms. Hawiey's 
SUV collided with Jim's pickup truck (R. 133 at 49-50). Hawiey *s rear bumper hit the 
front passenger side of Jim's truck (R. 133 at 51). The collision damaged Jim's fender 
and door, and cost $901.95 to repair (R. 133 at 56). 
There are about two car lengths between the parking stalls where Hawiey 
was parked and the gas pumps (R. 133 at 70). 
A clerk from the store attested to the fact that similar accidents had 
happened in the same fashion at that location, when no alcohol was involved (R. 133 at 
71). 
Jim testified that without pulling her SUV forward, Hawiey got out of her 
SUV, stood next to Jim, and asked Jim if there was any damage to her car (R. 133 at 51-
52). Hawiey told Jim that she had insurance and would take care of it the next day or so 
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if Jim would call (R. 133 at 52). 
Jim gave Hawley a piece of paper to write information on, and Hawley 
began writing her name, address and phone number (R. 133 at 52). 
Jim first testified that she could not read Hawley's writing, but later 
testified that Hawley had written a name other than Natasha on the paper, but that Jim 
could not recall what else Hawley had written, and that Jim did not know what Jim had 
done with the paper (R. 133 at 54, 55). 
Jim said that because she could not read Hawley's handwriting, she said 
she asked Hawley if Hawley had something Jim could read, and Hawley told her she left 
her license and insurance paperwork at home and had forgotten them (R. 133 at 53, 57). 
Jim told Hawley she preferred to get a police report and was going in the 
store to call the police, and Jim wrote down Hawley's license plate number and went 
inside the store (R. 133 at 53, 54). After Jim went in the store, she turned and looked for 
Hawley and realized that Hawley was gone, so Jim gave the license plate number to the 
store clerk, who called the police (R. 133 at 54, 55). 
Jim repeatedly testified that during the three minutes she spent with 
Hawley, Hawley was "wreathing" of alcohol and that it smelled strong (R. 133 at 54-55). 
Jim testified that Hawley was having difficulty standing and was holding onto the vehicle 
(R. 133 at 55). 
Jim maintained that she told the first investigating officer that she thought 
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Hawley was drunk because Jim smelled alcohol (R. 133 at 57). When asked if she gave 
the piece of paper Hawley had written on to the police officer, Jim said she had not, and 
Jim explained that she had given it to the store clerk, but then testified that she did not 
give the paper to the clerk or tell the police officer about it during her two encounters 
with the police on the night of the accident, but guessed she threw it away (R. 133 at 58-
59). 
Jeff Loveall, customer service clerk at the Maverick station, waited on 
Hawley on January 27, immediately prior to the accident, and sold her two six-packs of 
Zima, as he had a couple of times before (R. 133 at 60). Her demeanor was consistent 
with the other times she had come in to buy Zima - she carried herself well (R. 133 at 
66). 
He considered her sober and like any of his customers (R. 133 at 67). He 
could smell alcohol on her breath, but noted nothing abnormal about her behavior (R. 
133 at 62-63). She did not hold onto the counter or stagger, and had normal speech that 
was not slurred (R. 133 at 69). She responded in conversation at a normal pace and did 
not seem disoriented (R. 133 at 70). He did not recall her holding onto anything as she 
came in the store, and while he was serving other customers, it is part of his job and 
important to his safety to look at each customer as they come in and greet them (R. 133 at 
68). 
While he had had no training on how to tell if a person is too drunk to 
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drive, as part of his job training, he had read information about how to recognize the 
signs of intoxication, and he knew that if he sold alcohol to someone who was 
intoxicated, he could lose his job and have other problems and be in as much trouble as 
the intoxicated person (R. 133 at 63-64, 68, 71). He did not want to sell alcohol to 
someone who was intoxicated and would not do that (R. 133 at 68). Loveall also had 
personal experience with drinking alcohol (R. 133 at 67). 
Louis Manson, deputy sheriff, heard a dispatch report of a hit and run 
accident at 10:38 p.m., sometime after the accident and the conversation between Hawley 
and Jim (R. 133 at 74, 83). 
Dispatch reported that the accident involved a car with a registered owners 
Ronald and Noreen Hawley, and an address of 546 SundiaK so he responded to that 
address (R. 133 at 73, 74). 
There was no car at that address, so he went to the Maverick station (R. 
133 at 73). 
He met with Ms. Jim, and could not recall her having mentioned at anytime 
during the investigation anything about Hawley's having been intoxicated (R. 133 at 83). 
Manson testified at trial that he saw a paper in Jim's hand with Hawley's 
license plate number written on it, but he already had Hawley's license plate number 
from Hawley's having called, so he ignored the paper (R. 133 at 84). 
He testified at the preliminary hearing that Jim did not say anything about a 
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slip of paper on which Hawley had written, and that he did not remember the paper at all 
but testified at trial that his memory had improved on that particular point since the 
preliminary hearing, since he had heard Jim testify about it twice (R. 133 at 85, 86). 
He inspected the damage to Jim's car, and began gathering information 
from Jim when dispatch contacted him and informed him that Ms. Hawley was on the 
phone reporting the accident, and Manson asked dispatch to have Ms. Hawley return to 
the Maverick (R. 133 at 73). The dispatcher reported that Hawley was already out of her 
car, so Manson asked for her location, and met her there at 71 South 200 East (R. 133 at 
74). Because he had not gathered all of the information needed from Ms. Jim, Manson 
had Jim follow Manson to meet with Hawley (R. 133 at 74). 
Manson arrived at the address provided by dispatch, and it was a home 
owned by the fire department, and lived in by Joe Walker, about a mile from the 
Maverick station (R. 133 at 75). 
Manson arrived at Hawley's location at 10:53 p.m., and saw Hawley 
walking out of the residence with an insurance card in hand (R. 133 at 75). She walked 
to him, handed him the insurance card, and said, "Here is the information she wanted" or 
'This is what the woman wanted.'" (R. 133 at 75, 82). The insurance card applied to the 
SUV Hawley was driving in the accident (R. 133 at 82). 
Manson noticed that Hawley seemed unsteady on her feet and seemed to 
have difficulty closing the gate (R. 133 at 75). Manson asked for her license and 
9 
registration and she told him she had lost her registration, and got him her license from 
her wallet in the car (R. 133 at 75). 
Manson detected a strong odor of alcohol from Hawley and may have 
asked her if she had had anything to drink, and she told him she had had a couple (R. 133 
at 75). 
He asked her if she had had anything to drink since the accident and 
Hawley said she had not (R. 133 at 75). 
He had no recording of this conversation because he keeps his tape 
recorder in his desk drawer (R. 133 at 84). He did not ask her what she had had to drink 
or where she had drunk it, and he did not seize any Zima or any other alcoholic drinks 
(R. 133 at 83-84). 
Manson asked Hawley to perform field sobriety tests (R. 133 at 76). 
He described the horizontal gaze nystagmus test as follows: 
The horizontal gaze nystagmus test is a kind of a scientific 
test that's been developed for - for the detection of alcohol of 
placing your finger in front of the subjects eyes and you 
instruct them to hold their head still and follow your finger 
with their eyes and their eyes only. Ah, by that you can judge 
pretty accurately at least the fact that they are over a .10. 
(R. 133 at 77). 
He stated that during her horizontal gaze nystagmus test, she did not hold 
her head steady, but moved it to track his pen, and had a lack of smooth pursuit, which 
meant "she was kind of jerky following my finger." (R. 133 at 77). 
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He believed that this meant that she might be under the influence because 
she was not following his instructions (R. 133 at 77). He testified, 
Well, that indicates that she's not - she may be under the 
influence because she's not following instructions. The test 
is designed to measure a person's ability and a mind's ability 
to compute what you've told them to do and do it. And in 
this case she was not - not pure able to do it. 
(R. 133at78).1 
1
 Hawley did not challenge the admissibility of this test at trial and does not 
do so on appeal. However, this Court can gain insight into Officer Manson's lack of 
attention to detail by comparing his testimony with the theory behind and proper 
application of the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test discussed in State v. Witte, 836 P.2d 
1110,251 Kan. 313 (Kan. 1992), where the court stated, 
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has 
researched and recommended a battery of field sobriety tests to assist in this 
determination. The NHTSA claims the HGN test is an accurate and 
effective field sobriety test to determine whether a driver's alcohol 
concentration is above .10. 
Nystagmus is "an involuntary rapid movement of the eyeball, which 
may be horizontal, vertical, rotatory, or mixed." HGN is "a jerking of the 
eyes as they gaze to the side. Many people will exhibit some nystagmus, or 
jerking, as their eyes track to the extreme side. However, as people 
become intoxicated, the onset of the nystagmus, or jerking, occurs after 
fewer degrees of lateral deviation, and the jerking at the more extreme 
angles becomes more distinct." 1983 NHTSA Study at 2. 
"The theory behind the gaze nystagmus test is that there is a strong 
correlation between the amount of alcohol a person consumes and the angle 
of onset of the nystagmus." 
No special equipment is needed to administer the HGN test. The 
driver is instructed to keep his head stationary and follow an object, such as 
a pen, a penlight, or the officer's finger, with his eyes. The object is held at 
the driver's eye level and positioned about 12 to 15 inches away from the 
driver's eyes. The NHTSA then instructs officers: 
"Check the suspect's right eye by moving the object to the suspect's 
right. Have the suspect follow the object until the eyes cannot move further 
11 
He next had her perform the nine step walk and turn, instructing her to put 
her hands down to her sides, stand with her feet together, and watch him (R. 133 at 78). 
He demonstrated and instructed her 
how to start with her heel-to-toe. You walk nine steps, 
counting each step out loud, placing your hell-to-toe on each 
step. Means you - when you reach the ninth step, you leave 
your foot, whichever foot it is, planted and take small steps 
and pivot on that foot and then come back nine steps, heel-to-
toe, touching each heel-to-toe as - and counting each step out 
loud. 
to the side. Make this movement in about two seconds, and observe: 1) 
whether the suspect was about to follow the object smoothly or whether the 
motion was jerky; and 2) how distinct the nystagmus is at the maximum 
deviation. 
"Move the object a second time to the 45-degree angle of gaze, 
taking about four seconds. As the eye follows the object, watch for it to 
start jerking back and forth. If you think you see nystagmus, stop the 
movement to see if the jerking continues. If it does, this point is the angle 
of onset. If it does not, keep moving the object until the jerking does occur 
or until you reach the imaginary 45-degree line. Note whether or not the 
onset occurs before the 45-degree angle of gaze. (The onset point at a BAC 
of 0.10 percent is about 40 degrees.)" 
This procedure is repeated for the left eye. 
There are three possible signs of intoxication for each eye: 
"Angle of Onset ~ the more intoxicated a person becomes, the 
sooner the jerking will occur as the eyes move to the side. 
"Maximum Deviation — the greater the alcohol impairment the more 
distinct the nystagmus is when the eyes are as far to the side as possible. 
"Smooth Pursuit — an intoxicated person often cannot follow a 
slowly moving object smoothly with his eyes." 
A score of six points is possible, three for each eye. According to 
the NHTSA, if a driver scores four or more points, the driver's BAC is 
above .10. 
Id. at 251 Kan. 313 at 316-17 (citations omitted). 
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(R. 133 at 78). 
Manson said that Hawley began heel to toe as she should have, but then did 
not touch heel to toe as she walked, and was almost at full stride by the ninth step (R. 133 
at 78). He testified that she stepped off the line several times, staggered on the seventh 
step, did a poor turn without leaving her foot planted, and that she lifted her arms for 
balance (R. 133 at 79). 
Manson then asked her to perform a one legged stand, telling her to 
stand with her feet together and arms loosely at her sides, lift 
one foot, the foot of her choice, up six inches, point the toe 
towards the ground, lookin' at that toe, countin' "One 
thousand one, one thousand two, one thousand three" 
until he directed her to stop (R. 133 at 79). 
Manson testified that Hawley initially complained of her shoes, which had 
a flat sole and a very low heel (R. 133 at 79). Manson offered to move to a sidewalk 
where there were no rocks or anything, and she declined (R. 133 at 79). When she again 
began to perform the test, she began to sway at one thousand three, and he had her stop at 
one thousand seven because he was afraid she would fall because she was swaying so 
hard(R. 133 at 79). 
His mind was made up by then that she was too intoxicated to safely drive a 
car, so he placed her under arrest and took her to the sheriffs office, having Ms. Jim 
follow along (R. 133 at 80). 
At the sheriffs office, he asked Ms. Jim to fill out the paperwork, and then 
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took Hawley back to the jail and asked her to take a breath test, which she refused (R. 
133 at 80). 
His eight and a half years of experience as a deputy left him convinced that 
Hawley was too drunk to drive (R. 133 at 81). 
At some point, Manson asked Hawley why she had left the scene of the 
accident and she told him she had talked to Jim for a few minutes, but then lost track of 
Ms. Jim and went to the closest phone to call the police (R. 133 at 76, 81). When 
Manson pointed out that the closest phone was at the Maverick station, Hawley told him 
that she was going to Joe Walker's house anyway (R. 133 at 76). 
The court called Manson back to the stand after the parties had finished 
questioning him and asked if he could recall exactly what Hawley said when she refused 
to take the breath test (R. 133 at 87). He could not recall the conversation, but believed 
she said no after he read her the admonition, and that she said she understood the 
admonition (R. 133 at 87). 
While he did not book her into jail, he believed she was cooperative in the 
booking process, and was released to Joe Walker on her own recognizance without going 
to a cell or holding tank (R. 133 at 87-88). 
Defense Case 
Natasha Hawley testified that on the night of the accident she came home 
from work fairly late, about 8:00, had something quick to eat, and checked her messages 
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(R. 133 at 89). She had a message from a friend she had been meaning to call and 
returned this call, spending about an hour and a half or two hours on the phone (R. 133 at 
89). 
She hung up around 10:00 and was supposed to meet Joe Walker when he 
was coming home, around 10:00 (R. 133 at 89). She called to make sure he was home 
and told him she would be there shortly (R. 133 at 89). She brushed her teeth and 
combed her hair and may have applied some make up (R. 133 at 89). She stopped at the 
Maverick on the way to Joe's (R. 133 at 89). 
She bought two six packs of Zima and maybe some chips or something, 
and went to pull out of the parking lot, when she backed into Ms. Jim's truck, which was 
solid black (R. 133 at 90). It was about 10:15 at night, and the gas pump area where Jim 
was parked was poorly lit (R. 133 at 90). Hawley got out to see if everyone was okay, 
and found Ms. Jim, who assured her she was uninjured and that no one else was involved 
(R. 133 at 90). 
Because their cars were still adjacent, they could not see the damage from 
the collision and Jim asked Hawley to pull forward, which she did (R. 133 at 90-91). 
Hawley's car was not damaged, but Jim's had a dent in the passenger side (R. 133 at 91). 
Hawley told Jim that she had insurance, and Jim said she was relieved to 
hear it because she was in a hurry and did not want to wait for the police to make a report 
(R. 133 at 91). Jim asked for Hawley's insurance card, and Hawley gestured that she 
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would need to get inside her car to reach it, and climbed in to get it (R. 133 at 91). When 
she turned around, Ms. Jim was gone (R. 133 at 92). She looked around the parking lot, 
near the pay phone and inside the store, but could not see Ms. Jim, so she drove to 
Walker's home, about a mile away, the location of the nearest phone she could think of, 
which was also near the sheriffs office where she would eventually be reporting the 
accident (R. 133 at 92, 98). 
She did not think of using phones at motels near the Maverick station, and 
the fast food outlets were closed at that time (R. 133 at 98). 
She was not under the influence of alcohol at all during the accident (R. 
133 at 92). 
At Joe's house, she parked and got out of her car, and was feeling shaky 
and upset about the accident and knew she had to call the sheriffs office (R. 133 at 92). 
She turned around, got back in her car, got out a bottle of vodka from the back seat of 
her car, and quickly took several drinks of it to calm down (R. 133 at 93, 98). 
Then she went into Walker's house through the open front door, found him 
shaving, asked him where his cordless phone was, and called the sheriffs office (R. 133 
at 93). She reported her name and that she had been involved in a fender bender at the 
south Maverick, and she could hear other information about her accident in the 
background (R. 133 at 93). When asked for her address, Hawley walked out and got it 
off the front porch and provided it, 71 South 100 East (R. 133 at 94). 
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The dispatch operator told her that Deputy Manson wanted her to return to 
the Maverick, but she knew she had been drinking and did not want to return, so she told 
the operator she had parked the car, and agreed to meet Manson at Walker's (R. 133 at 
94). 
She went back inside Walker's and several minutes later when Manson 
drove up about thirty or forty minutes after the accident, she went outside to meet him (R. 
133 at 94). 
She had the insurance card in hand, and he asked her if she was Natasha 
Hawley and she said she was (R. 133 at 95). He asked her if she had had something to 
drink and she told him something to the effect that she had had a couple or two or three 
(R. 133 at 95). 
He asked her if she had had anything since reporting the accident, and she 
accurately responded that she had not (R. 133 at 95). 
He asked her to perform field sobriety tests, placed her under arrest, and 
drove to the sheriffs department, stopping to find Ms. Jim, who was having difficulty 
finding her way (R. 133 at 96). 
She refused the breath test because she knew she had been drinking after 
the accident (R. 133 at 96). She was not drinking before the accident (R. 133 at 96). 
On cross-examination, Hawley acknowledged that she is a criminal defense 
attorney who had defended several drunk drivers (R. 133 at 97). She had not had a case 
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wherein the investigating officer asked if the person had had anything to drink after 
reporting the accident, but explained that most of her cases involved people who reported 
accidents from the scene (R. 133 at 97). 
She conceded that in retrospect she should not have feared taking the 
breath test, given that she only drank after the accident, but maintained that at the time, 
she was afraid (R. 133 at 97). 
State's Rebuttal Case 
Deputy Manson maintained in rebuttai that he had asked Hawley if she had 
had anything to drink since the accident, not since reporting the accident (R. 133 at 99). 
He conceded that the conversation was not recorded, and that he did not 
inventory Hawley's car or ask her to turn over any alcohol she might have bought that 
night (R. 133 at 99-100). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court should have recused himself because Hawley routinely acts 
as an officer of his court. 
While rule 29 permits rejection of motions to disqualify on the basis of 
timeliness of the motions, the time limits of the rule do not supersede the trial courts' 
duties to eradicate the appearance of bias from judicial proceedings in this state. 
The implied consent statute permits the admission in criminal trials of 
refusals to take chemical tests, but by its terms applies only to those refusals which are 
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under that section of the code, which specifies that the refusals must be found by 
administrative hearing. 
Because the administrative hearing officer did not find a refusal in 
Hawley's case, the trial court erred in admitting evidence that she refused to take a breath 
test. 
On the facts of this case, the error was prejudicial. 
The evidence was insufficient to sustain the third degree felony conviction, 
because the documents relied on by the prosecutor did not establish the necessary 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The trial court's willingness to make assumptions in the absence of 
evidence constitutes reversible error. 
ARGUMENT 
L 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE 
RECUSED HIMSELF. 
A. Procedural Facts 
On January 28, 2000, the State charged Ms. Hawley with one count of 
driving under the influence, a third degree felony, and with one count of leaving the 
scene of an accident, a class B misdemeanor (R. 1-2). 
Hawley retained present counsel to represent her on February 11, 2000, and 
he filed his appearance on February 15, 2000 (R. 8, 10). 
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That same day, defense counsel moved the court to continue the 
arraignment and set it on the same day as the preliminary hearing, April 19, 2000 (R. 8-
9). 
Prior to the preliminary hearing set for April 19, 2000, on April 6, 2000, 
Hawley moved to disqualify Judge Anderson from the case, because she was an attorney 
who routinely appeared as an officer of his court (R. 20-25). 
Judge Anderson apparently found no merit to the motion and certified the 
matter to Presiding Judge Scott N. Johansen for his review (R. 26). 
Judge Johansen denied the motion to disqualify on the ground that it was 
not timely filed but was for purposes of delay, ruling that the bases for the motion were 
or should have been known to Hawley and counsel from the beginning of the case, and 
that the motion should have been filed at the latest by March 6, 2000 (R. 28). 
B. Governing Law 
One of the fundamental principles of due process is that all parties to a case 
are entitled to an unbiased, impartial judge. "A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic 
requirement of due process." Anderson v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 696 P.2d 
1219, 1221 (Utah 1985)(citation omitted). See also State v. Saunders. 1999 UT 59, 992 
P.2d 951, 961 (impartial judge is essential to a fair trial); Constitution of Utah, Article I § 
7 (due process); United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, § 1 (due process); 
Constitution of Utah, Article I § 12 (rights of criminal defendants); Utah Code Ann. § 
20 
77-1-6 (same). 
Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct2 appropriately places the burden 
2
 That canon provides in subsections (E) and (F) as follows: 
E. Disqualification. 
(1) A judge shall enter a disqualification in a proceeding in which the judge's 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where: 
(a) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a 
party's lawyer, a strong personal bias involving an issue in a case, or 
personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the 
proceeding; 
(b) the judge had served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, had 
practiced law with a lawyer who had served in the matter at the time of 
their association, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness 
concerning it; 
(c) the judge knows that the judge, individually or as a fiduciary, or 
the judge's spouse, parent or child wherever residing, or any other member 
of the judge's family residing in the judge's household, has an economic 
interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, 
or has any other more than de minimis interest that could be substantially 
affected by the proceeding; 
(d) the judge or the judge's spouse, or a person within the third degree 
of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person: 
(i) is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or 
trustee of a party; 
(ii) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; 
(iii) is known by the judge to have a more than de minimis 
interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding; 
(iv) is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material 
witness in the proceeding. 
(2) A judge shall keep informed about the judge's personal and fiduciary economic 
interests, and should make a reasonable effort to keep informed about the personal 
economic interests of the judge's spouse and minor children residing in the judge's 
household. 
F. Remittal of disqualification. A judge disqualified by the terms of Canon 3E may 
disclose the basis of the judge's disqualification and ask the parties and their lawyers to 
consider, out of the presence of the judge, whether to waive disqualification. If following 
disclosure of any basis for disqualification other than personal bias or prejudice 
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on trial courts to sua sponte recuse themselves from cases wherein their "impartiality 
might reasonably be questioned." State v. Neelev. 748 P.2d 1091.1094 (Utah), cert, 
denied, 487 U.S. 1220 (1988). The purpose of this standard is to promote public 
confidence in the judicial system. See id.; Madsen v. Prudential Fed'l Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n.. 767 P.2d 538, 544 n.5 (Utah 1988). "Nothing is more damaging to the public 
confidence in the legal system than the appearance of bias or prejudice on the part of the 
judge." State v. Gardner. 789 P.2d 273, 278 (Utah), cert denied. 474 U.S. 1090 (1990). 
When trial courts comply with the requirements of Utah Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 29, this shifts the burden to the defendant to establish actual bias or an abuse 
of discretion. State v. Alonzo. 973 P.2d 975 (Utah 1998), at 979. 
Actual bias is shown if the record reflects "a hostile feeling or spirit of ill 
will toward one of the litigants, or undue friendship or favoritism toward one." Haslam 
v. Morrison. 190 P.2d 520, 523 (Utah 1948). 
In cases involving an appearance of bias, prejudice must be shown to 
justify a reversal. Thus, in such cases, the Court would need to conclude that there was a 
likelihood of a more favorable result in the absence of the appearance of bias. See, e.g.. 
State v. Alonzo. 973 P.2d 975. 979 (Utah 1998). 
concerning a party, the parties and lawyers, without participation by the judge, all agree 
that the judge need not be disqualified, and the judge is then willing to participate, 
the judge may participate in the proceeding. The agreement shall be entered on the 
record, or if written, filed in the case file. 
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In the instant case, the fact that the defendant routinely served as an officer 
of Judge Anderson's court at a minimum constituted a circumstance from which Judge 
Anderson's impartiality was reasonably subject to question. 
As is discussed in Points II and III of this brief, Judge Anderson improperly 
admitted evidence of Hawley's refusal to submit to a chemical test, and improperly 
entered her DUI conviction as a third degree felony. He also denied her motion to reduce 
the degree of her conviction (R. 115-16). Se^ State v. Bvington, 200 P.2d 723, 726 
(Utah 1948)("Not only is a litigant entitled to have his case tried by an impartial and 
unbiased judge, but when, as here, he is a defendant in a criminal case, he is entitled to 
have the severity of his sentence determined by a jurist who has no personal bias or 
prejudice toward him as a defendant"), overruled on other grounds. First Fed. Sav. & 
Loan v. Shamanek. 684 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1984).3 
In the event that these factors do not establish prejudice within the meaning 
of Alonzo, they do show an abuse of discretion, particularly when considered with the 
fact that Hawley routinely practices as a criminal defense attorney in Anderson's 
jurisdiction, where she will be his probationer for the next three years. See id. 
C. Preservation of the Issue 
While the current rule 29 does place time limits on motions to disqualify 
3
 Shamanek overrules the portion of Byington interpreting the applicability 
of the privilege against self-incrimination. See Shamanek, 684 P.2d 1257, 1263 n.6. 
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and does permit courts to deny the motions on the basis of untimeliness,4 this rule does 
4
 As of November 1, 1999, Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 provides. 
Rule 29. Disability and disqualification of a judge or change of venue. 
(a) If, by reason of death, sickness, or other disability, the judge before whom a 
trial has begun is unable to continue with the trial, any other judge of that court or any 
judge assigned by the presiding officer of the Judicial Council, upon certifying that the 
judge is familiar with the record of the trial, may, unless otherwise disqualified, proceed 
with and finish the trial, but if the assigned judge is satisfied that neither he nor another 
substitute judge can proceed with the trial, the judge may, in his discretion, grant a new 
trial. 
(b) If, by reason of death, sickness, or other disability, the judge before whom a 
defendant has been tried is unable to perform the duties required of the court after a 
verdict of guilty, any other judge of that court or any judge assigned by the presiding 
officer of the Judicial Council may perform those duties. 
(c)(1)(A) A party to any action or the party's attorney may file a motion to 
disqualify a judge. The motion shall be accompanied by a certificate that the motion is 
filed in good faith and shall be supported by an affidavit stating facts sufficient to show 
bias or prejudice, or conflict of interest. 
(B) The motion shall be filed after commencement of 
the action, but not later than 20 days after the last of the 
following: 
(i) assignment of the action or hearing to the judge; 
(ii) appearance of the party or the party's attorney; or 
(iii) the date on which the moving party learns or with 
the exercise of reasonable diligence should have learned of 
the grounds upon which the motion is based. 
If the last event occurs fewer than 20 days prior to a 
hearing, the motion shall be filed as soon as practicable. 
(C) Signing the motion or affidavit constitutes a 
certificate under Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
subjects the party or attorney to the procedures and sanctions 
of Rule 11. No party may file more than one motion to 
disqualify in an action. 
(2) The judge against whom the motion and affidavit are directed 
shall, without further hearing, enter an order granting the motion or 
certifying the motion and affidavit to a reviewing judge. If the judge grants 
the motion, the order shall direct the presiding judge of the court or, if the 
court has no presiding judge, the presiding officer of the Judicial Council 
24 
not supersede Canon 3, or obviate the importance of the judicial responsibility to 
eradicate the appearance of judicial bias. See, e.g., Neeley. 
to assign another judge to the action or hearing. The presiding judge of the 
court, any judge of the district, any judge of a court of like jurisdiction, or 
the presiding officer of the Judicial Council may serve as the reviewing 
judge. 
(3)(A) If the reviewing judge finds that the motion and affidavit are 
timely filed, filed in good faith and legally sufficient, the reviewing judge 
shall assign another judge to the action or hearing or request the presiding 
judge or the presiding officer of the Judicial Council to do so. 
(B) In determining issues of fact or of law, the 
reviewing judge may consider any part of the record of the 
action and may request of the judge who is the subject of the 
motion and affidavit an affidavit responsive to questions 
posed by the reviewing judge. 
(C) The reviewing judge may deny a motion not filed 
in a timely manner. 
(d) (i) If the prosecution or a defendant in a criminal action believes that a fair and 
impartial trial cannot be had in the jurisdiction where the action is pending, either may, 
by motion, supported by an affidavit setting forth facts, ask to have the trial of the case 
transferred to another jurisdiction. 
(ii) If the court is satisfied that the representations 
made in the affidavit are true and justify transfer of the case, 
the court shall enter an order for the removal of the case to 
the court of another jurisdiction free from the objection and 
all records pertaining to the case shall be transferred 
forthwith to the court in the other county. If the court is not 
satisfied that the representations so made justify transfer of 
the case, the court shall either enter an order denying the 
transfer or order a formal hearing in court to resolve the 
matter and receive further evidence with respect to the 
alleged prejudice. 
(e) When a change of judge or place of trial is ordered all documents of record 
concerning the case shall be transferred without delay to the judge who shall hear the 
case. 
It should be noted that as of the date of the writing of this brief, Lexis does not 
reflect the November 1999 amendments to Rule 29. 
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While Judge Johansen may have been correct that the motion in the instant 
case was untimely filed because the grounds for the motion were apparent from the 
outset of the case,^ there is no evidence to marshal in support of his finding that the 
motion to disqualify was filed for the purpose of delay. The motion to disqualify was 
filed thirteen days prior to the preliminary hearing, and it was not at all clear then and is 
not clear now that the motion to disqualify Judge Anderson from hearing the preliminary 
hearing would have delayed a single hearing in the case. In filing the motion to 
disqualify, defense counsel signed a certificate of good faith (R. 20). 
Assuming arguendo that the motion was untimely filed, and would 
otherwise be considered waived, this Court should nonetheless address the issue because 
trial courts in this state have a duty to recuse themselves if their impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned under Cannon 3 and Neeley, regardless of what counsel does. 
See id. 
Alternatively, the Court should address the issue under the plain error and 
ineffective assistance of counsel doctrines. The plain error doctrine requires a showing 
of an obvious and harmful error which occurred which prejudiced the defendant's 
5
 Subsection (c)(l)(B)(iii) of Rule 29 requires motions to disqualify to be 
filed " 20 days after" "the date on which the moving party learns or with the exercise of 
reasonable diligence should have learned of the grounds upon which the motion is 
based." 
The affidavit of prejudice filed by defense counsel in support of the 
disqualification motion indicated that counsel researched the law prior to filing the 
motion (R. 23). 
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substantial rights, although the obviousness prong may be relaxed when a highly 
prejudicial error occurred which is more obvious in hindsight than it likely was before 
the trial court. See, e ^ State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 35 and n.8 (Utah), cert, denied, 
493 U.S. 814(1989). 
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, Hawley must demonstrate 
that trial counsel's performance fell below objectively reasonable standards of 
representation, and that this objectively deficient performance was prejudicial. See e.g. 
Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah), cert, denied 513 U.S. 966 (1994). The 
prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine requires proof of a 
reasonable probability of a different result in the absence of the objectively deficient 
performance. See e ^ State v. LovelL 758 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah 1988). 
The trial court's disqualification to act in this case should have been plain 
at least by the time that the motion to disqualify was filed, and pointed out the problems 
posed by Judge Anderson's presiding over the case. The constitutional law entitling 
Hawley to an impartial judge was well-established long before this trial, as was the law 
requiring trial courts to recuse themselves whenever their impartiality might reasonably 
be questioned. See e.g. Anderson v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 696 P.2d 1219, 
1221 (Utah 1985); Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct; State v. Neelev, 748 P.2d 
1091, 1094 (Utah), cert, denied, 487 U.S. 1220 (1988), supra. 
Trial counsel's failure to assert and protect Hawley's constitutional right to 
27 
an impartial judge constituted objectively deficient performance, because judicial 
impartiality is so key to the fundamental fairness of Hawley's criminal trial and 
sentencing. See, e ^ State v. Saunders. 1999 UT 59, 992 P.2d 951, 961 (impartial judge 
is essential to a fair trial). 
As was explained above, in the absence of the trial court's bias, there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a different result, because Judge Anderson would not have 
improperly admitted the refusal into evidence, and would not have entered the DUI 
conviction as a third degree felony if he had not presided over the case. Compare Points 
II and III, infra, with Alonzo, 973 P.2d 975 at 979-980 (inappropriate comments by 
judge were ruled harmless because they were made prior to trial, in chambers, outside 
presence of the jury). 
Even if the time limits of rule 29 should not have been clear to trial 
counsel, and even if the continuing validity of Canon 3 law should not have been 
obvious to the trial court, this Court is still empowered by the plain error doctrine to 
correct the error on appeal, to prevent a miscarriage of justice. See Eldredge. Given that 
the performance of the trial court in this case jeopardized Hawley's constitutional right to 
a fair trial, and also substantially undermines the appearance of integrity in the justice 
system, this Court should recognize and correct the error. See id_. 
Finally, this Court should address this issue on the merits in the exceptional 
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circumstances of this case,6 so that the lower courts are not misled by the amendments to 
rule 29 into thinking that issues of judicial bias can be resolved strictly on the basis of 
when a motion to disqualify is filed, without regard to Canon 3 and related law requiring 
courts to recuse themselves when their impartiality might reasonably be questioned. See, 
e.g.. State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, (Utah 1995)(recognizing that appellate court may 
consider issue raised for the first time on appeal in exceptional circumstances); State v. 
Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 926 and n.5 (Utah App. 1991)(discussing varied 
circumstances in which exceptional circumstances doctrine is applicable). 
IL 
The Trial Court Should Have Suppressed Hawley's Refusal. 
A. Procedural Facts 
Prior to trial, Hawley moved to exclude evidence of her refusal to take a 
chemical test because a refusal had not been found by administrative hearing, as required 
by Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (R. 44-47).7 The prosecutor opposed the motion and 
while Judge Anderson found the issue was not frivolous, he denied the motion to 
6
 The exceptional circumstances which apply in this case include the facts 
that Lexis did not reflect the November 1999 amendments to Rule 29 (and still does not 
as of the date of the writing of this brief), and that the trial courts apparently believe that 
because of these amendments, issues of bias can be resolved strictly on the basis of the 
timeliness of motions to disqualify. 
7
 In Hawley's case, the administrative hearing officer did not find a refusal. 
See R. 47 (letter from Bureau Chief of the Driver License Division, informing Hawley 
that the agency decided to take no action against her license), in the addendum to this 
brief. 
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suppress (R. 133 at 37-38). 
The court later instructed the jury in Instruction 7, 
You may consider evidence that defendant refused to submit 
to a breath or other test with respect to the charge of Driving 
Under the Influence of Alcohol if you believe it tends to 
show that defendant refused to submit to the test because she 
believed she was under the influence of alcohol and she 
thought the test would show that. 
(R. 94). 
B. Governing Law 
The implied consent statute, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10, sets forth 
numerous specific steps a police officer must follow in seeking a lawful refusal from a 
DUI suspect, sets forth several legislated details governing the administrative 
proceedings which are required to find a lawful refusal, and also sets forth standards 
governing judicial review of the administrative proceedings finding refusals. It states in 
the first seven subsections, 
(1) (a) A person operating a motor vehicle in this state is 
considered to have given his consent to a chemical test or 
tests of his breath, blood, or urine for the purpose of 
determining whether he was operating or in actual physical 
control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or breath 
alcohol content statutorily prohibited under Section 41-6-44, 
53-3-231, or 53-3-232, while under the influence of alcohol, 
any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug under 
Section 41-6-44, or while having any measurable controlled 
substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in the 
person's body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6, if the test is 
or tests are administered at the direction of a peace officer 
having grounds to believe that person to have been operating 
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or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having 
a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited under 
Section 41-6-44, 53-3-231, or 53-3-232, or while under the 
influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and 
any drug under Section 41-6-44, or while having any 
measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled 
substance in the person's body in violation of Section 41 -6-
44.6. 
(b) (i) The peace officer determines which of the tests are 
administered and how many of them are administered. 
(ii) If an officer requests more than one test, refusal by a 
person to take one or more requested tests, even though he 
does submit to any other requested test or tests, is a refusal 
under this section. 
(c) (i) A person who has been requested under this section 
to submit to a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or 
urine, may not select the test or tests to be administered. 
(ii) The failure or inability of a peace officer to arrange 
for any specific chemical test is not a defense to taking a test 
requested by a peace officer, and it is not a defense in any 
criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding resulting from a 
person's refusal to submit to the requested test or tests. 
(2) (a) If the person has been placed under arrest, has then been requested by 
a peace officer to submit to any one or more of the chemical tests under 
Subsection (1), and refuses to submit to any chemical test requested, the 
person shall be warned by the peace officer requesting the test or tests that a 
refusal to submit to the test or tests can result in revocation of the person's 
license to operate a motor vehicle. 
(b) Following the warning under Subsection (2)(a), if the person does not 
immediately request that the chemical test or tests as offered by a peace 
officer be administered a peace officer shall serve on the person, on behalf of 
the Driver License Division, immediate notice of the Driver License 
Division's intention to revoke the person's privilege or license to operate a 
motor vehicle. When the officer serves the immediate notice on behalf of the 
Driver License Division, he shall: 
(i) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of the operator; 
(ii) issue a temporary license effective for only 29 days; and 
(iii) supply to the operator, on a form approved by the Driver License 
Division, basic information regarding how to obtain a hearing before the 
Driver License Division. 
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(c) A citation issued by a peace officer may, if approved as to form by the 
Driver License Division, serve also as the temporary license. 
(d) As a matter of procedure, the peace officer shall submit a signed 
report, within ten calendar days after the date of the arrest, that he had 
grounds to believe the arrested person had been operating or was in actual 
physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or breath alcohol 
content statutorily prohibited under Section 41-6-44, 53-3-231, or 53-3-232, 
or while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol 
and any drug under Section 41-6-44, or while having any measurable 
controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's 
body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6, and that the person had refused to 
submit to a chemical test or tests under Subsection (1). 
(e) (i) A person who has been notified of the Driver License Division's 
intention to revoke his license under this section is entitled to a hearing. 
(ii) A request for the hearing shall be made in writing within ten 
calendar days after the date of the arrest. 
(iii) Upon written request, the division shall grant to the person an 
opportunity to be heard within 29 days after the date of arrest. 
(iv) If the person does not make a timely written request for a hearing 
before the division, his privilege to operate a motor vehicle in the state is 
revoked beginning on the 30th day after the date of arrest for a period of: 
(A) 18 months unless Subsection (2)(e)(iv)(B) applies; or 
(B) 24 months if the person has had a previous license sanction after 
July 1, 1993, under this section, Section 41-6-44.6, 53-3-223, 53-3-23 K 53-3-
232, or a conviction after July 1, 1993, under Section 41-6-44. 
(f) If a hearing is requested by the person, the hearing shall be conducted 
by the Driver License Division in the county in which the offense occurred, 
unless the division and the person both agree that the hearing may be held in 
some other county. 
(g) The hearing shall be documented and shall cover the issues of: 
(i) whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe that a 
person was operating a motor vehicle in violation of Section 41-6-44, 41-6-
44.6, or 53-3-231; and 
(ii) whether the person refused to submit to the test, 
(h) (i) In connection with the hearing, the division or its authorized agent: 
(A) may administer oaths and may issue subpoenas for the attendance 
of witnesses and the production of relevant books and papers; and 
(B) shall issue subpoenas for the attendance of necessary peace 
officers. 
(ii) The division shall pay witness fees and mileage from the 
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Transportation Fund in accordance with the rates established in Section 21-5-
4. 
(i) (i) If after a hearing, the Driver License Division determines that the 
person was requested to submit to a chemical test or tests and refused to 
submit to the test or tests, or if the person fails to appear before the Driver 
License Division as required in the notice, the Driver License Division shall 
revoke his license or permit to operate a motor vehicle in Utah beginning on 
the date the hearing is held for a period of: 
(A) 18 months unless Subsection (2)(i)(i)(B) applies; or 
(B) 24 months if the person has had a previous license sanction after 
July 1, 1993, under this section, Section 41-6-44.6, 53-3-223, 53-3-23L 53-3-
232, or a conviction after July 1, 1993, under Section 41-6-44. 
(ii) The Driver License Division shall also assess against the person, in 
addition to any fee imposed under Subsection 53-3-205(14), a fee under 
Section 53-3-105, which shall be paid before the person's driving privilege is 
reinstated, to cover administrative costs. 
(iii) The fee shall be cancelled if the person obtains an unappealed court 
decision following a proceeding allowed under this Subsection (2) that the 
revocation was improper. 
(j) (i) Any person whose license has been revoked by the Driver License 
Division under this section may seek judicial review. 
(ii) Judicial review of an informal adjudicative proceeding is a trial. 
Venue is in the district court in the county in which the offense occurred. 
(3) Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other condition 
rendering him incapable of refusal to submit to any chemical test or tests is 
considered to not have withdrawn the consent provided for in Subsection (1), 
and the test or tests may be administered whether the person has been arrested 
or not. 
(4) Upon the request of the person who was tested, the results of the test or 
tests shall be made available to him. 
(5) (a) Only a physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person 
authorized under Section 26-1-30, acting at the request of a peace officer, 
may withdraw blood to determine the alcoholic or drug content. This 
limitation does not apply to taking a urine or breath specimen. 
(b) Any physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person authorized 
under Section 26-1-30 who, at the direction of a peace officer, draws a 
sample of blood from any person whom a peace officer has reason to believe 
is driving in violation of this chapter, or hospital or medical facility at which 
the sample is drawn, is immune from any civil or criminal liability arising 
from drawing the sample, if the test is administered according to standard 
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medical practice. 
(6) (a) The person to be tested may, at his own expense, have a physician of 
his own choice administer a chemical test in addition to the test or tests 
administered at the direction of a peace officer. 
(b) The failure or inability to obtain the additional test does not affect 
admissibility of the results of the test or tests taken at the direction of a peace 
officer, or preclude or delay the test or tests to be taken at the direction of a 
peace officer. 
(c) The additional test shall be subsequent to the test or tests administered 
at the direction of a peace officer. 
(7) For the purpose of determining whether to submit to a chemical test or 
tests, the person to be tested does not have the right to consult an atlorney or 
have an attorney, physician, or other person present as a condition for the 
taking of any test. 
In its final subsection, the statute then permits the admission of refusals under that 
section in criminal trials, stating, 
(8) If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a chemical test or tests or 
any additional test under this section, evidence of any refusal is admissible in 
any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have 
been committed while the person was operating or in actual physical control 
of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, 
combination of alcohol and any drug, or while having any measurable 
controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's 
body. 
In finding Hawley's refusal admissible in this criminal trial. Judge Anderson 
apparently looked at the phrase kCunder this section" in subsection 8 of 41-6-44.10, supra, 
and assumed that the phrase modified only the nearest term - test. He stated, 
I looked at it when I first got your memorandum and - and it's certainly 
not a frivolous point. But what I think the - what it says under this section, 
what it means to is that the test that is required by this section and not that the 
determination has to be made under that section. And so, urn, I think, ah, 
evidence of any refusal is admissible, regardless of what the adminstrative 
determination was. But it's not a frivolous point and I appreciate your 
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bringing it up. 
(R. 133 at 37-38). 
In interpreting the statute in this manner, the trial court overlooked fundamental 
rules of statutory construction, which require Courts to evaluate statutes as a whole, and 
in the context of their operation. See, e.g.. Business Association of South Dakota. Inc. v. 
Medivest. Inc.. 882 P.2d 662, 665-66 (Utah 1994). In Medivest. the Court explained that 
the 
"terms of a statute are to be interpreted as a comprehensive whole and not in 
a piecemeal fashion." Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax 
Comm'n. 814 P.2d 581, 591 (Utah 1991); s_ee_also_ CP Nat'l Corp. v. Public 
Serv. Comm'n. 638 P.2d 519. 523 (Utah 1981) (holding that words are to be 
determined in light of their association with surrounding words and phrases). 
Moreover, section 61-6-3 must be read in the context of the entire Act. See 
Berrett v. Purser & Edwards. 876 P.2d 367, 369 (Utah 1994); see also 
Osuala v. Aetna Life & Casualty. 608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1980) (holding 
that "if there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning or application of the 
provisions of an act, it is appropriate to analyze the act in its entirety, in the 
light of its objective, and to harmonize its provisions in accordance with the 
legislative intent and purpose[.]" 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
Section 41-6-44.10 permits significant infringements on ordinary freedoms enjoyed 
by citizens,8 and creates significant penalties for properly obtained refusals. See id. 
The statute concomitantly sets forth very specific procedural requirements that all 
8
 See, e ^ Schmerber v. California. 384 U.S. 757. 770 (1966)(recognizing 
the privacy interests at issue when the government intrudes on one's bod> to gather 
evidence, and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment considerations which must be met 
to justify a search in these circumstances). 
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state actors, including the police, the driver's license division, and the courts, must 
follow as prerequisites to the legal finding and imposition of the consequences of a 
refusal. See id. 
The focus of Subsection 8 of § 41-6-44.10 is not tests, but is refusals, and in 
inserting the phrase "under this section," the legislature intended to reiterate the 
legislative prerequisites to refusals defined in the preceding portions of § 41-6-44.10. 
See id. 
In sum, the trial court's interpretation of the statute was in error, and should be 
corrected by this Court. Cf., e.g., Stephens v. Bonneville Travel Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 519 
(Utah 1997)(issues of statutory construction are reviewed without deference, for 
correctness). 
C. Prejudicial Nature of the Error 
The trial court's error in admitting the refusal in this case was prejudicial to Ms. 
Hawley, because her refusal of the test was the only portion of the state's evidence which 
was uncontroverted and inconsistent with the thrust of Ms. Hawley's defense that she 
was not guilty of driving under the influence, but only drank after the accident and prior 
to reporting it. Compare R. 133 at 97 (on cross-examination, Hawley conceded that in 
retrospect she should not have feared taking the breath test, given that she only drank 
after the accident). 
While Deputy Manson maintained in the case in chief and on rebuttal that Hawley 
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admitted to having been drinking prior to the accident (R. 133 at 75, 99), in contrast to 
Hawley's testimony that she admitted to having been drinking prior to reporting the 
accident (R. 133 at 95), the jurors may have found Manson lacking in credibility,9 or may 
have noted the significant instances wherein he could not recall details in conversations 
in the course of the investigation,10 and his failure to record the conversations (R. 133 at 
84,99-100). 
While Ms. Jim maintained that Hawley was intoxicated at the time of the accident, 
the jurors may have been suspicious of her testimony that Hawley "wreathed" of 
alcohol,11 particularly given Jim's apparent failure to report Hawley's intoxication to the 
police,12 Jim's established inconsistencies in other regards,13 and the testimony of the 
9
 Manson testified at trial that he saw a paper in her hand with Hawley's 
license plate number written on it, but he already had Hawley's license plate number 
from Hawley's having called, so he ignored the paper (R. 133 at 84). 
He testified at the preliminary hearing that Jim did not say anything about a slip of 
paper where Hawley had written, and that he did not remember the paper at all, but 
testified at trial that his memory had improved on that particular point since the 
preliminary hearing, since he had heard Jim testify about it twice (R. 133 at 85, 86). 
10
 Manson testified that he "may have" asked Hawley first if she had had 
anything to drink (R. 133 at 75). Manson could not recall the conversation surrounding 
Hawley's refusal (R. 133 at 87). 
11
 Jim repeatedly testified that during the three minutes she spent with 
Hawley, Hawley was "wreathing" of alcohol and that it smelled strong (R. 133 at 54-55). 
Jim testified that Hawley was having difficulty standing and was holding onto the vehicle 
(R. 133 at 55). 
12
 Jim maintained that she told the first investigating officer that she thought 
Hawley was drunk because Jim smelled alcohol (R. 133 at 57). 
Manson testified that he could not recall Jim having mentioned anything about 
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store clerk indicating that Hawley was not intoxicated immediately prior to the accident.14 
On this record, there is a reasonable likelihood that the jurors may well have sided 
with Hawley had the trial court properly excluded the refusal. 
I1L 
THE EVIDENCE DID NOT SUSTAIN 
Hawley's having been intoxicated at any time in the investigation (R. 133 at 83). 
13
 Jim at times testified that she could not read Hawley's writing on the paper 
Jim provided (R. 133 at 53, 57), but also testified that Hawley had written a name other 
than Natasha on the paper, but that Jim could not recall what else Hawley had written, 
and that Jim did not know what Jim had done with the paper (R. 133 at 54, 55). 
When asked if she gave the piece of paper Hawley had written on to the police 
officer, she said she had not, and Jim explained that she had given it to the store clerk, 
but then testified that she did not give the paper to the clerk or tell the police officer 
about it during her two encounters with the police on the night of the accident, but 
guessed she threw it away (R. 133 at 58-59). 
14
 Jeff Loveall, customer service clerk at the Maverick station, waited on 
Hawley on January 27, immediately prior to the accident, and sold her two six-packs of 
Zima, as he had a couple of times before (R. 133 at 60). Her demeanor was consistent 
with the other times she had come in to buy Zima - she carried herself well (R. 133 at 
66). 
He considered her sober and like any of his customers (R. 133 at 67). He could 
smell alcohol on her breath, but noted nothing abnormal about her behavior (R. 133 at 
62-63). She did not hold onto the counter or stagger, and had normal speech that was not 
slurred (R. 133 at 69). She responded in conversation at a normal pace and did not seem 
disoriented (R. 133 at 70). He did not recall her holding onto anything as she came in the 
store, and while he was serving other customers, it is part of his job and important to his 
safety to look at each customer as they come in and greet them (R. 133 at 68). 
Loveall had personal experience with drinking alcohol (R. 133 at 67). While he 
had had no training on how to tell if a person is too drunk to drive, as part of his job 
training, he had read information about how to recognize the signs of intoxication, and 
he knew that if he sold alcohol to someone who was intoxicated, he could lose his job 
and have other problems and be in as much trouble as the intoxicated person (R. 133 at 
63-64, 68, 71). He did not want to sell alcohol to someone who was intoxicated and 
would not do that (R. 133 at 68). 
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THE THIRD DEGREE FELONY CONVICTION. 
Subsection (6)(a) of the 1999 version of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 indicates, 
(6) (a) A third or subsequent conviction for a violation committed within 
six years of two or more prior convictions under this section is a third degree 
felony. 
Subsection (1) provides the relevant definitions, stating, 
(a) "prior conviction" means any conviction for a violation of: 
(i) this section; 
(ii) alcohol-related reckless driving under Subsections (9) and (10); 
(iii) local ordinances similar to this section or alcohol-related reckless 
driving adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43; 
(iv) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207; or 
(v) statutes or ordinances in effect in any other state, the United States, 
or any district, possession, or territory of the United States which would 
constitute a violation of this section or alcohol-related reckless driving if 
committed in this state, including punishments administered under 10 U.S.C. 
Sec. 815; 
(b) "serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes 
serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the 
function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of death; 
(c) a violation of this section includes a violation under a local ordinance 
similar to this section adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43; and 
(d) the standard of negligence is that of simple negligence, the failure to 
exercise that degree of care that an ordinarily reasonable and prudent person 
exercises under like or similar circumstances. 
Subsection 9 states the requirements for a conviction of alcohol related reckless 
driving, stating, 
(9) (a) (i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or no contest to 
a charge of a violation of Section 41-6-45,[15] of an ordinance enacted 
15
 Section 41-6-45 defines reckless driving as follows: 
(1) A person who operates any vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of 
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under Section 41-6-43, or of Section 41-6-44.6[16] in satisfaction of, or as a 
persons or property is guilty of reckless driving. 
(2) A person convicted of reckless driving is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. Upon a first conviction, the penalty is a minimum term of 
imprisonment of not fewer than five days, or a minimum fine of not less than 
$25. On a second or subsequent conviction, the penalty is a minimum term of 
imprisonment of not fewer than ten days, or a minimum fine of not less than $50. 
16
 The 1999 version of 41-6-44.6 provides 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Controlled substance" means any substance scheduled under Section 
58-37-4. 
(b) "Practitioner" has the same meaning as provided in Section 58-37-2. 
(c) "Prescribe" has the same meaning as provided in Section 58-37-2.. 
(d) "Prescription" has the same meaning as provided in Section 58-37-2. 
(2) In cases not amounting to a violation of Section 41-6-44, a person may 
not operate or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle within this 
state if the person has any measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a 
controlled substance in the person's body. 
(3) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section that the 
controlled substance was involuntarily ingested by the accused or prescribed by 
a practitioner for use by the accused. 
(4) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) is guilty of a class 
B misdemeanor. 
(5) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation 
of this section when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation has 
occurred, although not in the officer's presence, and if the officer has 
probable cause to believe that the violation was committed by the person. 
(6) The Driver License Division shall: 
(a) suspend, for 90 days, the driver license of a person convicted under 
Subsection (2); 
(b) revoke, for one year, the driver license of a person convicted of a 
second or subsequent offense under Subsection (2) if the violation is committed 
within a period of six years after the date of the prior violation; and 
(c) subtract from any suspension or revocation period the number of days 
for which a license was previously suspended under Section 53-3-223 or 53-3-231, 
if the previous suspension was based on the same occurrence upon which the 
record of conviction is based. 
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substitute for, an original charge of a violation of this section, the 
prosecution shall state for the record a factual basis for the plea, including 
whether or not there had been consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a 
combination of both, by the defendant in connection with the violation, 
(ii) The statement is an offer of proof of the facts that 
shows whether there was consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a 
combination of both, by the defendant, in connection with the 
violation. 
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before accepting the plea 
offered under this Subsection (9)(b) of the consequences of a violation of 
Section 41-6-44.6 or of Section 41-6-45. 
(c) The court shall notify the department of each conviction of Section 
41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 entered under this Subsection (9). 
In Hawley's sentencing proceeding, after conceding his burden to justify the third 
degree felony conviction beyond a reasonable doubt (R. 134 at 4), in support of the 
third degree felony conviction, the prosecutor submitted four certified documents (R. 
134 at 4-5). 
Exhibit 4, a judgment from Colorado, indicates a charge of 42-4-1301 Driving 
Under the Influence, and has a "G" under the column marked "plea," and under a 
portion of the form calling for "Hearing/Trial and Sentence," the form indicates 
^Charge G." The form indicates, tcDMVA, $300 fine, $300 suspended, jail sentence 
suspended completely" (R. 134 at 5-6). 
There was nothing to explain what UG" meant on the form, and no evidence that 
(7) The Driver License Division may not reinstate any license suspended or 
revoked as a result of a conviction under this section, until the convicted 
person has complied with the requirements of Subsection 41-6-44(7)(b). 
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the Colorado statute was the functional equivalent of any Utah statute. 
Exhibit 3 is a plea in abeyance from an Emery County justice court (R. 134 at 6). 
Exhibit 2 is a judgment from Judge Barrett finding Hawley guilty of alcohol 
related reckless driving (R. 134 at 7). There was no evidence presented that the 
prosecutor stated a factual basis for the plea, or that the trial court properly admonished 
Hawley, as required by subsection (9), supra. 
Exhibit 1 is a judgment indicating that Hawley had been adjudged guilty for 
"charge 41-6-44(10), DUI reduced to Reckless Alcohol/Drug Related, find guilty 
plea." However, elsewhere on the document, directly above the judge's signature, the 
form states CT)UI to reckless." No mention is made of "alcohol." In addition to bearing 
this ambiguity, there was no evidence of a factual basis for the plea by the prosecution, 
or of an admonition by the trial court, consistent with the mandatory requirements of 
subsection 9. 
After defense counsel articulated the shortcomings in the prosecutor's proof, the 
trial court stated, 
Um, as I consider the evidence that I have in front of me, though, 
Fm still convinced that, ah, that the defendant did have the previous 
convictions, um, and what's more, I think it's important that a higher court 
address this question. I think it's more than likely that the higher court will 
address it, if- if I find that the convictions are - are there, and so, um, 
recognizing that these are valid points that are being made here, that they're 
at least arguable, Fm - Fm still persuaded that the defendant does have at 
least arguable, I'm - Fm still persuaded that the defendant does have at 
least two prior convictions for a DUI and Fm going to sentence her, as, as 
if this is - I've got to sentence her on this for a third degree felony. But I 
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would hope that you're going to be appealing that, Mr. Brass, and get some 
- some guidance on these questions. I think we can get some change, either 
in the statute or the practice. 
(R. 134 at 11-12). 
When defense counsel asked the court to make specific findings, the court 
indicated that he would not rely on the plea in abeyance because it was not a 
conviction, and that he would assume that the pleas entered in the Utah district or 
circuit courts were entered in accordance with subsection 9 of 41-6-44 (R. 134 at 12-
13). Regarding the Colorado judgment, he found, 
With respect to the Mesa county, Colorado conviction, Tin inferring 
from the document that WCG" means guilty and from the fact that a fine was 
imposed, that it was imposed because there was a guilty finding or plea and 
because 48 hours of something required and completed. DMVA, I think, 
would be the same as our assessment and the title of the charge of driving 
under the influence. I don't think I have to parse the statute. And even if I 
did, I think it would be sufficient to just review the Colorado statute and 
see that it's similar to ours. But I believe - Fm persuaded beyond a 
reasonable doubt, from what I've seen on this document, that that was, in 
fact, a statute similar to ours for driving under the influence. I think that 
Colorado conviction is a valid conviction. That means by my reasoning the 
defendant has three previous convictions which is sufficient. 
Urn, if I end up sentencing her to prison, Fll give you a stay because 
I think if s a valid enough point that it ought to be resolved. 
(R. 134 at 14). 
The trial court was correct in ruling that a plea in abeyance did not constitute a 
prior conviction which could be used to establish felony DUI, because pleas in 
abeyance do not constitute convictions. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-l(l) ("For 
the purposes of this chapter: (1) Tlea in abeyance' means an order by a court, upon 
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motion of the prosecution and the defendant, accepting a plea of guilty or of no contest 
from the defendant but not, at that time, entering judgment of conviction against him 
nor imposing sentence upon him on condition that he comply with specific conditions 
as set forth in a plea in abeyance agreement."). See also State v. Hunsaker. 933 P.2d 
415, 416 (Utah App. 1997)(dismissing appeal because a w"plea in abeyance is not a 
final adjudication.'")(citation omitted). 
The trial court was incorrect in making assumptions to find that the three other 
convictions sustained the third degree felony conviction, because assumptions are 
fundamentally antithetical to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof which is 
codified at Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501, and which has been a fundamental tenet of 
due process in criminal cases under the state and federal Due Process Clauses for years. 
See, e.g.. State v. Lopes. 1999 UT 24 at ^ 13, 980 P.2d 191, 195. 
When the legislature sets forth specific elements which must be proved prior to 
the imposition of a criminal penalty, the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard of 
proof must apply to each element. W.17 
While sufficiency of the evidence questions are normally granted substantial 
deference on appeal, even in the context of jury verdicts, which receive greater 
17
 In Lopes, the court found that because the gang enhancement statute set 
forth specific elements prerequisite to the imposition of a higher penalty, the government 
had the burden to prove the elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Id 
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deference than bench verdicts,18 assumptions are not permissible. As the court stated in 
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983), 
The fabric of evidence against the defendant must cover the gap between 
the presumption of innocence and the proof of guilt. In fulfillment of its 
duty to review the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be 
drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict, the reviewing court 
will stretch the evidentiary fabric as far as it will go. But this does not 
mean that the court can take a speculative leap across a remaining gap in 
order to sustain a verdict. The evidence, stretched to its utmost limits, must 
be sufficient to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
State in reJ.SJHL Utah, 642 P.2d 386 (1982); State v. Kourbelas, Utah, 
621 P.2d 1238, 1240(1980). 
Petree at 444-45. See also State in re I.. R.L., 739 P.2d 1123, 1129 (Utah App. 
1987)(same). 
Particularly when a trial court is deciding an issue that is so statutory in nature, 
assumptions are unwarranted and inappropriate. See Walker, supra. 
There is some evidence to marshal in support of the trial court's finding that the 
Colorado judgment was in fact a conviction, because the letter G might be an 
abbreviation for a plea or finding of guilty, and because there was a fine imposed and 
forty-eight hours of something required, there may have been a conviction. DMVA 
might stand for driving a motor vehicle while ability impaired by or while under the 
influence of alcohol. However, such assumptions ordinarily do not amount to proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Petree, supra. 
See, e.g.. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). 
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As a matter of law, the evidence fell short regarding the Colorado judgment 
because there was no proof regarding the elements of the Colorado statute or 
conviction, to permit determination of whether the Colorado judgment was equivalent 
to a Utah DUI or alcohol-related reckless driving offense, as required by § 41-6-44, 
supra. 
By reviewing the Colorado statute, §42-4-1301 in Addendum 1 to this brief, this 
Court can see that the Colorado statute is some fifteen pages long when single-spaced, 
and differs substantially from the Utah statute, creating numerous offenses with 
substantially lower burdens of proof than are required to prove a DUI or alcohol 
related reckless driving in Utah. See ijd. For example, a person might be in violation 
of the Colorado statute for having a blood alcohol level greater than .02, or might be in 
violation for being an habitual drug user and driving a car, or might be in violation for 
driving while being impaired to the slightest degree by having inhaled a toxic vapor. 
See id. 
Because there was and is no evidence to show whether the Colorado judgment 
would have constituted a violation of § 41-6-44 or alcohol-related reckless driving if 
committed in this state under subsection (l)(a)(v) of § 41-6-44, the trial court was in 
error in relying on this judgment to convict Hawley of a felony. See, e.g., Petree. 
Given that the trial court did not rely on any evidence whatsoever, but relied on 
assumptions that the Utah pleas were entered in accordance with 41-6-44(9), it is not 
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necessary or possible to marshal the evidence in support of his rulings.19 
This Court can take judicial notice of the fact that trial courts at times err in the 
entry of guilty pleas, and that it cannot be assumed that guilty pleas were entered 
perfectly. See, e ^ , State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987), and its 
progeny.20 
Just as the prosecution has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt to 
prove each element of the gang enhancement statute if it wishes to obtain a the 
penalties established in that statute, the prosecution must prove each element of the 
felony DUI statute if it wishes to obtain a third degree felony conviction. See, 
e.g. Lopes, supra. 
Because the prosecution's evidence was insufficient to sustain the third degree 
felony DUI conviction, this Court should order that conviction reversed and the charge 
dismissed. See, e.g., Petree, supra, 659 P.2d at 447 (finding evidence insufficient to 
sustain second degree murder conviction, and ordering the conviction reversed and the 
defendant discharged from custody). 
19
 See, e.g.. Woodward v. Fazzio. 823 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 
('There is, in effect, no need for an appellant to marshal the evidence when the findings 
are so inadequate that they cannot be meaningfully challenged as factual 
determinations."). 
20
 In Gibbons, the Utah Supreme Court set forth the requirement that the trial 
courts comply strictly with Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 in entering guilty pleas. 
Several cases since Gibbons have found errors in the entry of the pleas. See, e.g.. State 
v. Valencia. 776 P.2d 1332, 1334-35 (Utah App. 1989). 
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CONCLUSION 
Because the prosecution failed to meet its burden of proving the third degree 
felony DUI charged, this Court should reverse that conviction and order the charge 
dismissed. 
This Court should also reverse the conviction for leaving the scene of an 
accident, and remand this case for a new trial, free of the errors discussed above. 
DATED this *gT day ofyff& , 2001. 
EDWARD K. BRASS 
Attorney for Appellant 
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Defendant • Pro Se D with counsel 
Charge. • People's motion to dismiss the following granted. 
#1 
DISMISSALS / AMENDMENTS / PLEAS 
CERTIFIED TO BE A FUfIg/ n \ f l S 





D People's motion to amend the followTi'fV.lrAte^? OR "^CT Ct 
OF ORIGINAL IN MY C U S K 
Clerk 
Defendant JQ Pro Se n with counsel 
Q Sentence Trial to • Court D Jury of 
Charge Findings Fine Suspended Costs Total Que. SOE to 
6? ^ao 3od m^0,0^/3 






6? OJUJCLSA k^i^y 
JaJl Suspended 
dM o&ntpidM yfifnr^tstPS 
PRE-SENTENCE / PROBATION 
• Alcohol evaluation ordered. LJ Pre-sentence report ordered. 
D Hearing set for Bond Continued. 
• Probation granted for . to 
D Probation denied. D Stay of execution during probation. 
• Deferred prosecution granted for , to 
D Deferred sentencing granted for . to 
["] Restitution of $ ordered by 
D Other stipulations. • Probation Terminated. Case Closed. 
r
~] Peoples motion allowing defendant's guilty plea to be withdrawn, granted. 
Defendant discharged from deferred sentence. 
H Advisement given per Sec. 24-72-308. CRS. 
G Final Adjudication. So ordered and approved. 
n







Fines . . ^ ^ . . .
 r . . . , - , . . .-.;.,, . . 
Victim As3j$tahce Fee (37%) . . . .' .J . . 
Court Costs' . j ^ T . .JT\ . / C ^ - J • • 
Sheriff Fee/Witn/s4 Fktef. .' -f<\- . . 
Alcohol Fee 













Total Due S 
H T V B 
Amount 
ns /m/99 08:53 FAI 435 381 564* 
David A. Blackwell (4542) 
Emery County Attorney 
Mary L. Manley (5474) 
Deputy County Attorney 
P.O. Box 249 
Castle Dale, Utah 84513 
Telephone: (435)381-2543 
IN THE EMERY COUNTY JUSTICE COURT 
SECOND PRECINCT, STATE OF UTAH 





i PLEA IN ABEYANCE 
> Docket No. 98-01559 
) Citation No. D268691 
I Honorable Betty Burns 
WHEREAS, the above Defendant has been charged with the offense of ALCOHOL 
RELATED RECKLESS DRIVING, a Class B Misdemeanor, in violation of § 41*6-44, Utah 
Code Annotated, as amended; and, 
WHEREAS, the State of Utah, by and through the Emery County Attorney's Office, 
deems it appropriate and in the interest of justice that the Defendant's plea be held in abeyance, 
in accordance with § 77-2a-l, et. seq., Utah Code Annotated (1953) as amended; and, 
WHEREAS, the Defendant acknowledges that she has intelligeatly and voluntarily 
entered into all phases of the negotiations and execution of this Plea in Abeyance, and has had 
the benefit of counsel, hereby knowingly and intelligently waive her constitutional rights to a 
speedy trial and time for sentencing, as designated in Rule 22(a), Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure; 
EMERY COUNTY COMMISSION HfoU^lK 
COPY 
^8/10/99 08:54 FAX 435 381 5644 EMERY COUNTY COMMISSION ©003 
NOW, THEREFORE, the parties agree as follows: 
1. By this document, the Defendant enters her plea of Guilty to the charge of 
ALCOHOL RELATED RECKLESS DRIVING, a Class B Misdemeanor. 
2. The Defendant's plea will be held in abeyance for a period of 12 months or such 
lesser time as it takes for the Defendant to complete the terms of this agreement, but for a term of 
not less than ninety days. 
3. In the event that the Defendant successfully complies with all of the provisions of 
this Agreement for the term above stated, the charge on file herein will be dismissed, and the 
Defendant shall not thereafter be subject to further prosecution for the offense involved. 
4. During the terra of this Agreement, the Defendant shall not violate any laws, with 
the exception of minor traffic violations. 
5. The Defendant shall comply with the following terms and conditions: 
(a). Pay a fee in the amount of $405.00 to the Emery County Second Precinct Justice 
Court at the rate ofS J06)*O0 per month beginning on the 7th day o f U ^ & t 1999 and each 
month thereafter until paid in full. Payments are to be made to the Emery County Justice Court, 
Second Precinct, 48 Farrer Street, Green River, UT. 84525. 
(b). The Defendant shall not consume alcohol during the term of this agreement. The 
Defendant shall submit to testing of her bodily fluids upon the reasonable suspicion of law 
enforcement that she has consumed alcohol. 
(c). The Defendant shall enter into, pay for and successfully complete, and provide 
proof of completion of a Level II Substance Abuse Treatment Program. 
IN NO EVENT SHALL THIS AGREEMENT TERMINATE PRIOR TO THE 
FULL PAYMENT OF FEES. 
08/10/99 08:54 FAI 435 381 5644 EMERY COUNTY COMMISSION 12)004 
U ( / U < ' V V U # : 4 J tXX 4 4 * 4 * 1 44 t l t K i W U O i l WAJUSSi^ UJUUZ 
Acceptance of the terms and conditions of this Agreement acknowledged by 
the signatures below. 
Date MARYJL.«MANLE> 
Depofy Emery County Attorney 






APPROVED by the Court on the 7 ^ day of July, 1999. 
INS 
Justlce'Coitft Judge 
02/15/00 TUE 12:55 FAI 801 23$ 7396 
I STATE OF UTAH 
SLC CIRCUIT 2nd Fir CR1M ©001 
x ) 
'County of Salt Uke ) 
t, the undersigned, Clerk of 
Utah. Sat UkeCoui 
certify that the 




ict Court, State of Utah 
KEwdQUN.?Y, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION II 








DOB: ' _ / _ 
Interpreter 
CHARGES '^"^ n . T . 
Defendant 
Date f\/ffV <gft \<jcil Time 
Judge/Gomm U)\\ \ lArvt ^* F&ft&Pt-jT 
Clerk r r i ^ f t K 
Plaintiff Counsel 
Defense Counsel 
Amended R •€,/?„ 
Amended 
THE COURT SENTENCED THE DEFENDANT AS FOLLOWS: 
m Jail <3£ H f l L f ^ Suspended 
.9£ fifths 
Defendant to Commence Serving Jail Sentence 
(2) FtneAmt$ Susp. $. Fee$ Rne Bal $ 
.oO TOTAL FINE(S) DUE $ 
Payment Schedule: Pay $ ) SCi per month/1 st Pmt. Due / ^iP-tffr— Last Prat, Due 10 "^9^ 
(3) Court Costs $ 
(4) Community Service/WP V<0 {J^io .c through OcxxPJT - iSc/ .9 - f ^ r t ~ 9 L y 
(5) Restitution $ Pay to: • Court • Victim D Snow Proof to Court 
Attorney Fees $ 
(6) Probation \% rr\tmn*&* r^Qood Behavior D AP&P D ACEC D Other 
(7) Terms of probation: 
,$Q No Further Violations 
• AA Meetings / wk / month 




G Counseling thru 
ST Cte|*s JEPffft-
Q InKM Treatment 
G Health Testing 
n Crime lab Procedure 
D 
J8I Proof of Qi^gmf* CtJ&£ 3 V ^PiTC^Sh 
(8) Plea in Abeyance/ Diversion 
(0) Review / / , ai 
in compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act. individuals 
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative 
aids and services) during this proceeding should call Third District 
Court at 238-7391, at least throe working days prior to the proceeding, 
APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF JUDGMENT STAMP USE 
**v^+jr. 
ffol&Efc JUDGE 
02/15/00 TUE 12:56 FAI 801 238 7396 SLC CIRCUIT 2nd Fir CRTM ©003 


















Sep 14, 199B 0.00 
Reason 




















•97 Piled: Citation 
•97 Arraignment scheduled on May 29, 1997 at 09:00 AM in Third 
Floor - W35 with Judge BARRETT. 
•97 Pretrial Conference scheduled on July 15, 1997 at 09;CO AM in 
Arraignment - S31 with Judge BARRETT, 
•97 Note: Mis Arraignment JUDGE: WILLIAM W BARRETT 
•97 Note: TAPE: 1068 COUNT: 3320 
•97 Note: ATD: LOYD, CHARLES PRO; FISHER, SCOTT 
•97 Note: Deft is present 
•97 Note: Information was read in court 
•97 Note: PTC scheduled for 07/15/97 at 0900 A in room ? 
with WWB 
•97 Note: Chrg 
-97 Not«: Chrg 
•97 Note: Chrg 
-97 Nnfe: Hearing 
BARRETT 
•97 Note: TAPE: 1425 
-97 Note: Deft Present 




(PRE TRIAL CONFERENCE) 
Plea: Not Guilty-
Plea: Not GUilty 
Plea-. Not Guilty 
JUDGE: WILLIAM W 
COUNT: 511 
PRO 
scheduled for 09/26/97 at 97 Note:. TRJ 
with WWB 
•97 Note: UNABLE TO REACH A SETTLEMENT 




in room ? 
07-15-
07-15-
08-13-97 Note: FILED PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR 
DISCOVERY AND 
08-18-97 Note: CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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1 1 - 2 1 
1 1 - 2 1 
1 1 - 2 1 
11-21-
57 Note: 03JECT 
97 Jury Trial scheduled on November 21, 1997 at 09:00 AM in 
Arraignment. - S31 with Judge BARRETT. 
97 Tracking started for Jury Trial. Review date Oct 0?., 1998. 
97 Pine Accuunt created Total Due: 1500.00 
97 Note: Hearing (JURY TRIAL): JUDGE: WTT.LIAM W 
BARRETT 
97 Note: TAPE: 2374 COUNT: 203 
97 Note: Deft Present 
97 Note: Deft advised of riahts 
97 Noce: ATD: LOYD, CHARLES P PRO: WRYE, DONALD 
97 Note: ON CITY MOTION C/O AMEND COUNT 1 W l TO ARR AND DISM 
REMAINING 
•97 Note: CHARGES 
97 JMOte: DEFT PLED GUILTY TO AMENDED COUNT i 
97 Note: Chrg: DUI TO RECKLESS 
Guilty Plea 
Fine Amount: 
P l e a : Not G u i l t y F i n d ; 
1 5 0 0 . 0 0 Suopcnded; 
1 1 - 2 1 -
1 1 - 2 1 -
1 1 - 2 1 
1 1 - 2 1 -
1 1 - 2 1 -
1 1 - 2 1 -
1 1 - 2 1 -












Jail: 90 DAYS 
Community Service; 
OPEN CONT/VRH 
FOLLOW TOO CLOSE 
Suspended: 50 DAYS 
40 HOURS in lieu of jail, 
P l e a s Not G u i l t y Fiiad: 








-97 Note: Chrg: 
Dismissed 
-97 Note: Chrg: 
Dismissed 




-97 Note*. Tntal fines and aoacastnents. , : 
1500.00 
-97 Note: 13 MONTHS GOOD BEHAVIOR PROBATION WITH THE 
CONDITIONS 
-97 Nrthe: 1. NO FURTHER VIOLATIONS 
-97 Note: 2. PAY FINES AND FEES (150,00 PER MONTH STRTING 1/2/98} 
-97 Note-. 3. COMPLETE COMMUNITY SERVICE 
-97 Note: 4. COMPLETE ALCHOL CLASS AND PROVIDE PROOF TO COURT BY 
2/20/98 
-97 Note: Charge 12.24.100 Sev MB was amended to 12.52.350.L Sev 
MB 
-97 Note: Began tracking Fine Stay Review on 
10/02/98 
-97 Note: Began tracking Community Service Review on 
08/20/9B 
-97 Note: Began tracking Other Review on 
02/20/98 
-S3 Note: **C0LLECTI0N LETTER I MAILED 01/08/98 DUE 01/18/98 
-SO Note: de£L called collections will mail payment today 
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Note; Mail Payment 
•98 Note: "COLLECTION LETTER 1 MAILED 02/C4/98 DUE 02/14/98 
•98 Pine payment Received; 150.00 
Note: Mail Payment 
-98 Note: **COLLECTION LETTKR.i MAILED 3/5 (DUE 3/15)** 
Payment Received; 
MAILED 4/15 DUE 4/25 
98 Fine 150.00 
Note; Mail Payment 
•98 Note: "COLLECTION LET 1 
98 Note; COLLECTIONS LETTER 2 MAILED 5/7/98 DUE 5/14/98 
•98 Fine Payment Received: 300.00 
Note: Mail Payment 
•98 Note: ^COLLECTIONS LETTER 1 MAILED 6/5/98 DUE fi/15/98 
•98 Fine Payment Received: 3 00.00 
Note: Mail Payment 
•98 Note: *COLLECTI0N LET 2 MAILED 7/7 DUE 7/14 
•98 Note: "COLLECTIONS LETTER RETURNED TO TWP COURT UNDELIVERED 
• 98 Note: Address changed from 818 OAK ST 
MOAB UT 84532 
-*8 Note: Address changed to 546 Sundial Drive MOAB UT 84538-2763 
•98 Note: Address chanqed from 546 Sundial Drive M O A B UT 
84538-2763 
•98 Note: Address changed to 150 PAST CENTER STREET MOAB UT 84532 
•98 Fine Payment Received: 450.30 
Note: Mail Payment 
-99 Tracking ended for Fine. 
-99 Note: IN THE INTEREST OP .JUSTICE C/O CASE CLOSED. CASE SENT 
TO STATE DEBT COLLECTION. 
-99 Note: there was no money sent to State Debt Collection - fine 
has been paid in full 
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THIRD CIRCUIT COURT - WVC 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CITY OF WEST VALLEY CITY JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
VS (COMMITMENT) 
HAWLEY, NATASHA CASE NO: 955013327 
680 E 5TH AVE DOB: 10/26/68 
SLC UT TAPE: COUNT: 
DATE: 02/28/96 
CITATION: 
THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT BEING ADJUDGED GUILTY FOR THE 
OFFENSE(S) AS FOLLOWS: 
Charge: 41-6-44(10) DUI REDUCED TO RECKLESS-ALC/DRUG RELATED 
Plea: Find: Guilty Plea 
Fine: 600.00 Susp: 0.00 
Jail: 60 DA Susp: 60 DA ACS: 
Charge: 41-12A-3 02 OPERATING VEHICLE W/O INSURANCE 
Plea: Find: Dismissed 
Fine: 0.00 Susp: 0.00 
Jail: 0 Susp: 0 ACS: 
Charge: 41-6-61 IMPROPER USAGE OF LANES 
Plea: Find: Dismissed 
Fine: 0.00 Susp: 0.00 
Jail: 0 Susp: 0 ACS: 
Charge: 41-6-69 TURN/STOP/CHANGE LANES W/O SIGNAL 
Plea: Find: Dismissed 
Fine: 0.00 Susp: 0.00 
Jail: 0 Susp: 0 ACS: 
FEES AND ASSESSMENTS: 
Fine Description: FINE -PROSECUTOR SPL 
Credit: 0.00 Paid: 0.00 Due: 324.33 
Fine Description: SURCHARGE - 85% 
Credit: 0.00 Paid: 0.00 Due: 275.67 
TOTAL FINES AND ASSESMENTS: 
Credit: 0.00 Paid: 0.00 Due: 600.00 
Vfi 
HAWLEY, NATASHA CASE NO: 955013327 PAGE 2 
PROBATION TERMS & CONDITIONS: 
12 MO PROB W/COURT TERMS: 1 NO OTHER VIOLATIONS 2. CONTINUE 
COUNSELING W/PRIVATE PROVIDER FOR ANXIETY AND PROVIDE VERIF OF 
CONTINUED COUNSELING OR COMPLETION OF COUNSELING BY END OF 
PROBATION 3. TIMELY PAYMENT 
TRACKING: 




PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE 02/28/96 09:00 AM in rm 2- with JUDITH ATHERTON 
DOCKET INFORMATION: 
Chrg: DUI TO RECKLESS Plea: Find: Guilty Plea 
Fine Amount: 600.00 Suspended: .00 
Jail: 60 DAYS Suspended: 60 DAYS 
BY THE COURT 
A c#* 
JUDGE, CIRCUIT COUR^ 
Bv ^  , N / M 
NOTE: APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 § S ^ &
 i J S ~ D A 7 c t f c ^ Q N O F JUDGE OF ENTRY OF THIS JUDGMENT. % ~ - . . u w r u j u u c 
»tt.fe^mytoMt and seal ot ac»u C6Qitt?>9 ^-Jnrf^ 
*A>>' - « - M . ^ . ^ r 
EDWARD K. BRASS 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
175 EAST 400 SOUTH, SUITE 400 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
PHONE (801) 322-5678 
FAX (801) 322-5677 
February 2, 2001 
Office of Driver License Services 
Attn: DUI Section 
P.O. Box 30560 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84130-0560 
Re: Justin E. Swensen 
DOB: 10/10/78 
Arrest Date: 1/26/01 
Dear Sir or Madam: 
I hereby request a hearing on the seizure of the above-referenced person's driver's 
This letter shall also serve as a request for a copy of the relating police report. 
Sir 
/ard K. Brass 
Attorney at Law 
EKB/krg/ 
.' -AIM ^ 8 aitl'l 
Colorado Revised Statutes § 42-4-1031 
42-4-1301. Driving under the influence - driving while impaired - driving with excessive 
alcoholic content - tests - penalties - useful public service program - alcohol and drug 
driving safety program 
(1) (a) It is a misdemeanor for any person who is under the influence of alcohol or one or 
more drugs, or a combination of both alcohol and one or more drugs, to drive any vehicle 
in this state. 
(b) It is a misdemeanor for any person who is impaired by alcohol or by one or more 
drugs, or by a combination of alcohol and one or more drugs, to drive any vehicle in this 
state. 
(c) It is a misdemeanor for any person who is an habitual user of any controlled substance 
defined in section 12-22-303 (7), C.R.S., to drive any vehicle in this state. 
(d) For the purposes of this subsection (1), one or more drugs shall mean all substances 
defined as a drug in section 12-22-303 (13), C.R.S., and all controlled substances defined 
in section 12-22-303 (7), C.R.S., and glue-sniffing, aerosol inhalation, and the inhalation of 
any other toxic vapor or vapors. 
(e) The fact that any person charged with a violation of this subsection (1) is or has been 
entitled to use one or more drugs under the laws of this state shall not constitute a defense 
against any charge of violating this subsection (1). 
(f) "Driving under the influence" means driving a vehicle when a person has consumed 
alcohol or one or more drugs, or a combination of alcohol and one or more drugs, which 
alcohol alone, or one or more drugs alone, or alcohol combined with one or more drugs 
affects the person to a degree that the person is substantially incapable, either mentally or 
physically, or both mentally and physically, to exercise clear judgment, sufficient physical 
control, or due care in the safe operation of a vehicle. 
(g) "Driving while ability impaired" means driving a vehicle when a person has consumed 
alcohol or one or more drugs, or a combination of both alcohol and one or more drugs, 
which alcohol alone, or one or more drugs alone, or alcohol combined with one or more 
drugs, affects the person to the slightest degree so that the person is less able than the person 
ordinarily would have been, either mentally or physically, or both mentally and physically, 
to exercise clear judgment, sufficient physical control, or due care in the safe operation of 
a vehicle. 
(h) Pursuant to section 16-2-106, C.R.S., in charging a violation of paragraph (a) of this 
subsection (1), it shall be sufficient to describe the offense charged as "drove a vehicle under 
the influence of alcohol or drugs or both". 
(i) Pursuant to section 16-2-106, C.R.S., in charging a violation of paragraph (b) of this 
subsection (1), it shall be sufficient to describe the offense charged as "drove a vehicle while 
impaired by alcohol or drugs or both". 
(2) (a) It is a misdemeanor for any person to drive any vehicle in this state when the 
amount of alcohol, as shown by analysis of the person's blood or breath, in such person's 
blood is 0.10 or more grams of alcohol per hundred milliliters of blood or 0.10 or more 
grams of alcohol per two hundred ten liters of breath at the time of driving or within two 
hours after driving. During a trial, if the state's evidence raises the issue, or if a defendant 
presents some credible evidence, that the defendant consumed alcohol between the time that 
the defendant stopped driving and the time that testing occurred, such issue shall be an 
affirmative defense, and the prosecution must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
minimum 0.10 blood or breath alcohol content required in this paragraph (a) was reached 
as a result of alcohol consumed by the defendant before the defendant stopped driving. 
(a. 5) It is a class A traffic infraction for any person under twenty-one years of age to drive 
any vehicle in this state when the amount of alcohol, as shown by analysis of the person's 
breath subject to subsection (7) of this section, is at least 0.02 but not more than 0.05 grams 
of alcohol per two hundred ten liters of breath at the time of driving or within two hours 
after driving. 
(b) In any prosecution for a violation of this subsection (2), the defendant shall be entitled 
to offer direct and circumstantial evidence to show that there is a disparity between what the 
tests show and other facts so that the trier of fact could infer that the tests were in some way 
defective or inaccurate. Such evidence may include testimony of nonexpert witnesses 
relating to the absence of any or all of the common symptoms or signs of intoxication for the 
purpose of impeachment of the accuracy of the analysis of the person's blood or breath. 
(c) Pursuant to section 16-2-106, C.R.S., in charging a violation of this subsection (2), it 
shall be sufficient to describe the offense charged as "drove a vehicle with excessive alcohol 
content". 
(3) The offenses described in subsections (1) and (2) of this section are strict liability 
offenses. 
(4) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 18-1-408, C.R.S., during a trial of any 
person accused of violating paragraph (a) of subsection (1) and subsection (2) of this 
section, the court shall not require the prosecution to elect between the two violations. The 
court or a jury may consider and convict the person of either paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) 
of subsection (1) or subsection (2), or both paragraph (a) of subsection (1) and subsection 
(2), or both paragraph (b) of subsection (1) and subsection (2) of this section. If the person 
is convicted of more than one violation, the sentences imposed shall run concurrently. 
(5) In any prosecution for a violation of paragraph (a) or (b) of subsection (1) of this 
section, the amount of alcohol in the defendant's blood or breath at the time of the 
commission of the alleged offense or within a reasonable time thereafter, as shown by 
analysis of the defendant's blood or breath, shall give rise to the following presumptions: 
(a) If there was at such time 0.05 or less grams of alcohol per one hundred milliliters of 
blood as shown by analysis of such person's blood or if there was at such time 0.05 or less 
grams of alcohol per two hundred ten liters of breath as shown by analysis of such person's 
breath, it shall be presumed that the defendant was not under the influence of alcohol and 
that the defendant's ability to operate a vehicle was not impaired by the consumption of 
alcohol. 
(b) If there was at such time in excess of 0.05 but less than 0.10 grams of alcohol per one 
hundred milliliters of blood as shown by analysis of such person's blood or if there was at 
such time in excess of 0.05 but less than 0.10 grams of alcohol per two hundred ten liters of 
breath as shown by analysis of such person's breath, such fact shall give rise to the 
presumption that the defendant's ability to operate a vehicle was impaired by the 
consumption of alcohol, and such fact may also be considered with other competent 
evidence in determining whether or not the defendant was under the influence of alcohol. 
(c) If there was at such time 0.10 or more grams of alcohol per one hundred milliliters of 
blood as shown by analysis of such person's blood or if there was at such time 0.10 or more 
grams of alcohol per two hundred ten liters of breath as shown by analysis of such person's 
breath, it shall be presumed that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol. 
(d) The limitations of this subsection (5) shall not be construed as limiting the 
introduction, reception, or consideration of any other competent evidence bearing upon the 
question of whether or not the defendant was under the influence of alcohol or whether or 
not the defendant's ability to operate a vehicle was impaired by the consumption of alcohol. 
(6) Following the lawful contact with a person who has been driving a vehicle, and when 
a law enforcement officer reasonably suspects that a person was driving a vehicle while 
under the influence of or while impaired by alcohol, the law enforcement officer may 
conduct a preliminary screening test using a device approved by the executive director of 
the department of public health and environment after first advising the driver that the driver 
may either refuse or agree to provide a sample of the driver's breath for such preliminary 
test; except that, if the driver is under twenty-one years of age, the law enforcement officer 
may, after providing such advisement to the person, conduct such preliminary screening test 
if the officer reasonably suspects that the person has consumed any alcohol. The results of 
this preliminary screening test may be used by a law enforcement officer in determining 
whether probable cause exists to believe such person was driving a vehicle in violation of 
paragraph (a) or (b) of subsection (1) or subsection (2) of this section and whether to 
administer a test pursuant to paragraph (a) of subsection (7) of this section. Neither the 
results of such preliminary screening test nor the fact that the person refused such test shall 
be used in any court action except in a hearing outside of the presence of a jury, when such 
hearing is held to determine if a law enforcement officer had probable cause to believe that 
the driver committed a violation of paragraph (a) or (b) of subsection (1) or subsection (2) 
of this section. The results of such preliminary screening test shall be made available to the 
driver or the driver's attorney on request. The preliminary screening test shall not substitute 
for or qualify as the test or tests required by paragraph (a) of subsection (7) of this section. 
(7) (a) (I) On and after July 1, 1983, any person who drives any motor vehicle upon the 
streets and highways and elsewhere throughout this state shall be deemed to have expressed 
such person's consent to the provisions of this paragraph (a). 
(II) (A) Any person who drives any motor vehicle upon the streets and highways and 
elsewhere throughout this state shall be required to take and complete, and to cooperate in 
the taking and completing of, any test or tests of such person's breath or blood for the 
purpose of determining the alcoholic content of the person's blood or breath when so 
requested and directed by a law enforcement officer having probable cause to believe that 
the person was driving a motor vehicle in violation of subsection (1) or (2) of this section. 
Except as otherwise provided in this section, if a person who is twenty-one years of age or 
older requests that said test be a blood test, then the test shall be of his or her blood; but, if 
such person requests that a specimen of his or her blood not be drawn, then a specimen of 
such person's breath shall be obtained and tested. A person who is under twenty-one years 
of age shall be entitled to request a blood test unless the alleged violation is a class A traffic 
infraction, in which case a specimen of such person's breath shall be obtained and tested, 
except as provided in sub-subparagraph (B) of this subparagraph (II). 
(B) If a person elects either a blood test or a breath test, such person shall not be permitted 
to change such election, and, if such person fails to take and complete, and to cooperate in 
the completing of, the test elected, such failure shall be deemed to be a refusal to submit to 
testing. If such person is unable to take, or to complete, or to cooperate in the completing 
of a breath test because of injuries, illness, disease, physical infirmity, or physical incapacity, 
or if such person is receiving medical treatment at a location at which a breath testing 
instrument certified by the department of public health and environment is not available, the 
test shall be of such person's blood. 
(III) Any person who drives any motor vehicle upon the streets and highways and 
elsewhere throughout this state shall be required to submit to and to complete, and to 
cooperate in the completing of, a test or tests of such person's blood, saliva, and urine for the 
purpose of determining the drug content within the person's system when so requested and 
directed by a law enforcement officer having probable cause to believe that the person was 
driving a motor vehicle in violation of paragraph (a), (b), or (c) of subsection (1) of this 
section and when it is reasonable to require such testing of blood, saliva, and urine to 
determine whether such person was under the influence of, or impaired by, one or more 
drugs, or one or more controlled substances, or a combination of both alcohol and one or 
more drugs, or a combination of both alcohol and one or more controlled substances. 
(IV) Any person who is required to take and to complete, and to cooperate in the 
completing of, any test or tests shall cooperate with the person authorized to obtain 
specimens of such person's blood, breath, saliva, or urine, including the signing of any 
release or consent forms required by any person, hospital, clinic, or association authorized 
to obtain such specimens. If such person does not cooperate with the person, hospital, clinic, 
or association authorized to obtain such specimens, including the signing of any release or 
consent forms, such noncooperation shall be considered a refusal to submit to testing. No 
law enforcement officer shall physically restrain any person for the purpose of obtaining a 
specimen of such person's blood, breath, saliva, or urine for testing except when the officer 
has probable cause to believe that the person has committed a violation of section 18-3-105, 
18-3-106 (1) (b), 18-3-204, or 18-3-205 (1) (b), C.R.S., and the person is refusing to take 
or to complete, or to cooperate in the completing of, any test or tests, then, in such event, the 
law enforcement officer may require a blood test. Evidence acquired through such 
involuntary blood test shall be admissible in any prosecution for a violation of subsection 
(1) or (2) of this section and for a violation of section 18-3-105, 18-3-106 (1) (b), 18-3-204, 
or 18-3-205 (1) (b), C.R.S. 
(V) Any driver of a commercial motor vehicle requested to submit to a test as provided 
in subparagraph (II) of this paragraph (a) shall be warned by the law enforcement officer 
requesting the test that a refusal to submit to the test shall result in an out-of-service order 
as defined under section 42-2-402 (8) for a period of twenty-four hours and a revocation of 
the privilege to operate a commercial motor vehicle for one year as provided under section 
42-2-126. 
(b) (I) The tests shall be administered at the direction of a law enforcement officer having 
probable cause to believe that the person had been driving a motor vehicle in violation of 
subsection (1) or (2) of this section and in accordance with rules and regulations prescribed 
by the state board of health concerning the health of the person being tested and the accuracy 
of such testing. Strict compliance with such rules and regulations shall not be a prerequisite 
to the admissibility of test results at trial unless the court finds that the extent of 
noncompliance with a board of health rule has so impaired the validity and reliability of the 
testing method and the test results as to render the evidence inadmissible. In all other 
circumstances, failure to strictly comply with such rules and regulations shall only be 
considered in the weight to be given to the test results and not to the admissibility of such 
test results. It shall not be a prerequisite to the admissibility of test results at trial that the 
prosecution present testimony concerning the composition of any kit used to obtain blood, 
urine, saliva, or breath specimens. A sufficient evidentiary foundation concerning the 
compliance of such kits with the rules and regulations of the department of public health and 
environment shall be established by the introduction of a copy of the manufacturer's or 
supplier's certificate of compliance with such rules and regulations if such certificate 
specifies the contents, sterility, chemical makeup, and amounts of chemicals contained in 
such kit. 
(II) No person except a physician, a registered nurse, a paramedic, as certified in part 2 
of article 3.5 of title 25, C.R.S., an emergency medical technician, as defined in part 1 of 
article 3.5 of title 25, C.R.S., or a person whose normal duties include withdrawing blood 
samples under the supervision of a physician or registered nurse shall be entitled to withdraw 
blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic or drug content therein. In any trial for 
a violation of subsection (1) or (2) of this section, the testimony of a law enforcement officer 
that he or she witnessed the taking of a blood specimen by a person who the law 
enforcement officer reasonably believed was authorized to withdraw blood specimens shall 
be sufficient evidence that such person was so authorized, and testimony from the person 
who obtained the blood specimens concerning such person's authorization to obtain blood 
specimens shall not be a prerequisite to the admissibility of test results concerning the blood 
specimens obtained. No civil liability shall attach to any person authorized to obtain blood, 
breath, saliva, or urine specimens or to any hospital, clinic, or association in or for which 
such specimens are obtained as provided in this subsection (7) as a result of the act of 
obtaining such specimens from any person submitting thereto if such specimens were 
obtained according to the rules and regulations prescribed by the state board of health; 
except that this provision shall not relieve any such person from liability for negligence in 
the obtaining of any specimen sample. 
(c) Any person who is dead or unconscious shall be tested to determine the alcohol or 
drug content of the person's blood or any drug content within such person's system as 
provided in this subsection (7). If a test cannot be administered to a person who is 
unconscious, hospitalized, or undergoing medical treatment because the test would endanger 
the person's life or health, the law enforcement agency shall be allowed to test any blood, 
urine, or saliva which was obtained and not utilized by a health care provider and shall have 
access to that portion of the analysis and results of any tests administered by such provider 
which shows the alcohol or drug content of the person's blood, urine, or saliva or any drug 
content within the person's system. Such test results shall not be considered privileged 
communications, and the provisions of section 13-90-107, C.R.S., relating to the 
physician-patient privilege shall not apply. Any person who is dead, in addition to the tests 
prescribed, shall also have the person's blood checked for carbon monoxide content and for 
the presence of drugs, as prescribed by the department of public health and environment. 
Such information obtained shall be made a part of the accident report. 
(d) If a person refuses to take, or to complete, or to cooperate with the completing of any 
test or tests as provided in this subsection (7), the person shall be subject to license 
revocation pursuant to the provisions of section 42-2-126. Such revocation shall take effect 
prior to and shall stay the remainder of any previous suspension, or denial in lieu of 
suspension, and shall not run concurrently, in whole or in part, with any previous or 
subsequent suspensions, revocations, or denials which may be provided for by law, 
including any suspension, revocation, or denial which results from a conviction of criminal 
charges arising out of the same occurrence for a violation of subsection (1) or (2) of this 
section. The remainder of any suspension, or denial in lieu of suspension, stayed pursuant 
to the provisions of this paragraph (d) shall be reinstated following the completion of any 
revocation provided for in section 42-2-126. Any revocation taken under said section shall 
not preclude other actions which the department is required to take in the administration of 
the provisions of this title. 
(e) If a person refuses to take or to complete, or to cooperate with the completing of, any 
test or tests as provided in this subsection (7) and such person subsequently stands trial for 
a violation of subsection (1) of this section, the refusal to take or to complete, or to cooperate 
with the completing of, any test or tests shall be admissible into evidence at the trial, and a 
person may not claim the privilege against self-incrimination with regard to admission of 
refusal to take or to complete, or to cooperate with the completing of, any test or tests. 
(8) No court shall accept a plea of guilty to a non-alcohol-related or non-drug-related 
traffic offense or guilty to an offense under paragraph (a.5) of subsection (2) of this section 
from a person charged with a violation of subsection (1) or (2) (a) of this section; except that 
the court may accept a plea of guilty to a non-alcohol-related or non-drug-related traffic 
offense or to an offense under paragraph (a.5) of subsection (2) of this section upon a good 
faith representation by the prosecuting attorney that the attorney could not establish a prima 
facie case if the defendant were brought to trial on the original alcohol-related or 
drug-related offense. 
(9) (a) (I) Every person who is convicted of a violation of paragraph (a) or (c) of 
subsection (1) or paragraph (a) of subsection (2) of this section shall be punished by 
imprisonment in the county jail for not less than five days nor more than one year, and, in 
addition, the court may impose a fine of not less than three hundred dollars nor more than 
one thousand dollars. Except as provided in subparagraph (II) of paragraph (f) of this 
subsection (9), the minimum period of imprisonment provided for such violation shall be 
mandatory. In addition to any other penalty that is imposed, every person who is convicted 
of a violation to which this subparagraph (I) applies shall perform not less than forty-eight 
hours nor more than ninety-six hours of useful public service. The performance of the 
minimum period of service shall be mandatory, and the court shall have no discretion to 
suspend the mandatory minimum period of performance of such service. 
(II) Upon a conviction of a violation of paragraph (a) or (c) of subsection (1) or paragraph 
(a) of subsection (2) of this section, which violation occurred within five years after the date 
of a previous violation, for which there has been a conviction, of paragraph (a) or (c) of 
subsection (1) or paragraph (a) of subsection (2) of this section, or of section 18-3-106 (1) 
(b) (I) or 18-3-205 (1) (b) (I), C.R.S., the offender shall be punished by imprisonment in the 
county jail for not less than ninety days nor more than one year, and, in addition, the court 
may impose a fine of not less than five hundred dollars nor more than one thousand five 
hundred dollars. The minimum period of imprisonment as provided for such violation shall 
be mandatory, but the court may suspend up to eighty days of the period of imprisonment 
if the offender complies with the provisions of subparagraph (I) of paragraph (f) of this 
subsection (9). In addition to any other penalty that is imposed, every person who is 
convicted of a violation to which this subparagraph (II) applies shall perform not less than 
sixty hours nor more than one hundred twenty hours of useful public service. The 
performance of the minimum period of service shall be mandatory, and the court shall have 
no discretion to suspend the mandatory minimum period of performance of such service. 
(III) Upon conviction of a violation of paragraph (a) or (c) of subsection (1) or paragraph 
(a) of subsection (2) of this section, which violation occurred within five years after the date 
of a previous violation, for which there has been a conviction, of paragraph (b) of subsection 
(1) of this section, the offender shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for not 
less than seventy days nor more than one year, and, in addition, the court may impose a fine 
of not less than four hundred fifty dollars nor more than one thousand five hundred dollars. 
The minimum period of imprisonment as provided for such violation shall be mandatory, 
but the court may suspend up to sixty-three days of the period of imprisonment if the 
offender complies with the provisions of subparagraph (I) of paragraph (f) of this subsection 
(9). In addition to any other penalty that is imposed, every person who is convicted of a 
violation to which this subparagraph (III) applies shall perform not less than fifty-six hours 
nor more than one hundred twelve hours of useful public service. The performance of the 
minimum period of service shall be mandatory, and the court shall have no discretion to 
suspend the mandatory minimum period of performance of such service. 
(b) (I) Every person who is convicted of a violation of paragraph (b) of subsection (1) of 
this section shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for not less than two days 
nor more than one hundred eighty days, and, in addition, the court may impose a fine of not 
less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars. Except as provided in 
subparagraph (II) of paragraph (f) of this subsection (9), the minimum period of 
imprisonment provided for such violation shall be mandatory. In addition to any other 
penalty which is imposed, every person who is convicted of a violation to which this 
subparagraph (I) applies shall perform not less than twenty-four hours nor more than 
forty-eight hours of useful public service. The performance of the minimum period of 
service shall be mandatory, and the court shall have no discretion to suspend the mandatory 
minimum period of performance of such service. 
(II) Upon a conviction of a second or subsequent violation of paragraph (b) of subsection 
(I) of this section, which violation occurred within five years of the date of a previous 
violation, for which there has been a conviction, of paragraph (b) of subsection (1) of this 
section, the offender shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for not less than 
forty-five days nor more than one year, and, in addition, the court may impose a fine of not 
less than three hundred dollars nor more than one thousand dollars. The minimum period of 
imprisonment as provided for such violation shall be mandatory, but the court may suspend 
up to forty days of the period of imprisonment if the offender complies with the provisions 
of subparagraph (I) of paragraph (f) of this subsection (9). In addition to any other penalty 
which is imposed, every person who is convicted of a violation to which this subparagraph 
(II) applies shall perform not less than forty-eight hours nor more than ninety-six hours of 
useful public service. The performance of the minimum period of service shall be 
mandatory, and the court shall have no discretion to suspend the mandatory minimum period 
of performance of such service. 
(III) Upon conviction of a violation of paragraph (b) of subsection (1) of this section, 
which violation occurred within five years after the date of a previous violation, for which 
there has been a conviction, of paragraph (a) or (c) of subsection (1) or paragraph (a) of 
subsection (2) of this section, or of section 18-3-106 (1) (b) (I) or 18-3-205 (1) (b) (I), 
C.R.S., the offender shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for not less than 
sixty days nor more than one year, and, in addition, the court may impose a fine of not less 
than four hundred dollars nor more than one thousand two hundred dollars. The minimum 
period of imprisonment as provided for such violation shall be mandatory, but the court may 
suspend up to fifty-four days of the period of imprisonment if the offender complies with 
the provisions of subparagraph (I) of paragraph (f) of this subsection (9). In addition to any 
other penalty that is imposed, every person who is convicted of a violation to which this 
subparagraph (III) applies shall perform not less than fifty-two hours nor more than one 
hundred four hours of useful public service. The performance of the minimum period of 
service shall be mandatory, and the court shall have no discretion to suspend the mandatory 
minimum period of performance of such service. 
(IV) Notwithstanding the other provisions of this paragraph (b), if a person is charged 
with an offense of driving under the influence under paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this 
section and the amount of alcohol in such person's blood, as shown by analysis of the 
person's blood or breath, was 0.20 or more grams of alcohol per one hundred milliliters of 
blood or 0.20 or more grams of alcohol per two hundred ten liters of breath at the time of 
driving or within two hours after driving, and if for such incident such person is then 
convicted of the lesser offense of driving while ability impaired under paragraph (b) of 
subsection (1) of this section, then, because of such aggravating factor, such person is 
subject to the penalties imposed by paragraph (a) of this subsection (9) for such conviction. 
(c) The provisions of this subsection (9) relating to the performance of useful public 
service are also applicable to any defendant who receives a deferred prosecution in 
accordance with section 16-7-401, C.R.S., or who receives a deferred sentence in 
accordance with section 16-7-403, C.R.S., and the completion of any stipulated amount of 
useful public service hours to be completed by the defendant shall be ordered by the court 
in accordance with the conditions of such deferred prosecution or deferred sentence as 
stipulated to by the prosecution and the defendant. 
(d) For the purposes of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this subsection (9), a person shall be 
deemed to have a previous conviction of subsection (1) or (2) of this section, or section 
18-3-106 (1) (b) (I) or 18-3-205 (1) (b) (I), C.R.S., if such person has been convicted under 
the laws of any other state, the United States, or any territory subject to the jurisdiction of 
the United States of an act which, if committed within this state, would be a violation of 
subsection (1) or (2) of this section, or section 18-3-106 (1) (b) (I) or 18-3-205 (1) (b) (I), 
C.R.S. 
(e) (1) Upon conviction of a violation of subsection (1) or (2) of this section, the court 
shall sentence the defendant in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b) of 
this subsection (9). The court shall consider the alcohol and drug evaluation required 
pursuant to subsection (10) of this section prior to sentencing; except that the court may 
proceed to immediate sentencing without considering such alcohol and drug evaluation if 
the defendant has no prior or pending charges under this section and neither the defendant 
nor the prosecuting attorney objects. If the court proceeds to immediate sentencing, without 
considering such alcohol and drug evaluation, such alcohol and drug evaluation shall be 
conducted after sentencing, and the court shall order the defendant to complete the education 
and treatment program recommended in such alcohol and drug evaluation. If the defendant 
disagrees with the education and treatment program recommended in such alcohol and drug 
evaluation, the defendant may request the court to hold a hearing to determine which 
education and treatment program should be completed by the defendant. 
(II) For sentencing purposes concerning convictions for second and subsequent offenses, 
prima facie proof of a defendant's previous convictions shall be established when the 
prosecuting attorney and the defendant stipulate to the existence of the prior conviction or 
convictions or the prosecuting attorney presents to the court a copy of the driving record of 
the defendant provided by the department of revenue of this state, or provided by a similar 
agency in another state, which contains a reference to such previous conviction or 
convictions or presents an authenticated copy of the record of the previous conviction or 
judgment from any court of record of this state or from a court of any other state, the United 
States, or any territory subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. The court shall not 
proceed to immediate sentencing when there is not a stipulation to prior convictions or if the 
prosecution requests an opportunity to obtain a driving record or a copy of a court record. 
The prosecuting attorney shall not be required to plead or prove any previous convictions 
at trial and sentencing concerning convictions for second and subsequent offenses shall be 
a matter to be determined by the court at sentencing. 
(f) (I) The sentence of any person subject to the provisions of subparagraph (II) or (III) 
of paragraph (a) or subparagraph (II) or (III) of paragraph (b) of this subsection (9) may be 
suspended to the extent provided for in said subparagraphs if the offender receives a 
presentence alcohol and drug evaluation; based on that evaluation, satisfactorily completes 
an appropriate level I or level II alcohol and drug driving safety education or treatment 
program; and abstains from the use of alcohol for a period of one year from the date of 
sentencing. Such abstinence shall be monitored by the treatment facility by the 
administration of disulfiram or by any other means that the director of the treatment facility 
deems appropriate. If, at any time during the one-year period, the offender does not 
satisfactorily comply with the conditions of the suspension, that sentence shall be reimposed, 
and the offender shall spend that portion of such offender's sentence which was suspended 
in the county jail. 
(II) In the case of any person who is sentenced pursuant to the provisions of subparagraph 
(I) of paragraph (a) or subparagraph (I) of paragraph (b) of this subsection (9), the court may 
suspend the mandatory minimum of any sentence of imprisonment if, as a condition thereof, 
the offender has a presentence or postsentence alcohol and drug evaluation and satisfactorily 
completes and meets all financial obligations of a level I or level II program as is determined 
appropriate by the alcohol and drug evaluation required pursuant to subsection (10) of this 
section. 
(g) In addition to the penalties prescribed in this subsection (9): 
(I) Persons convicted of violations of subsection (1) or (2) of this section are subject to 
the costs imposed by section 24-4.1-119 (1) (c), C.R.S., relating to the crime victim 
compensation fund; 
(II) Persons convicted of violations of subsection (1) or paragraph (a) of subsection (2) 
of this section are subject to an additional penalty surcharge of not less than twenty-five 
dollars and not more than five hundred dollars for programs to address persistent drunk 
drivers. Any moneys collected for such surcharge shall be transmitted to the state treasurer, 
who shall credit the same to the persistent drunk driver cash fund created by section 
42-3-130.5. 
(Ill) (A) A person convicted of a violation of paragraph (a) or (b) of subsection (1) or of 
paragraph (a) of subsection (2) of this section, which violation occurred on or after July 1, 
2000, and within five years after the date of a previous violation for which there was a 
conviction under paragraph (a) or (b) of subsection (1) or paragraph (a) of subsection (2) of 
this section, shall be required to obtain a restricted license pursuant to the provisions of 
section 42-2-132.5 for a period of not less than one year after reinstatement. 
(B) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2000, p. 1078, @ 7, effective July 1, 2000.) 
(h) In addition to any other penalty provided by law, the court may sentence a defendant 
who is convicted pursuant to this section to a period of probation for purposes of treatment 
not to exceed two years. As a condition of probation, the defendant shall be required to make 
restitution in accordance with the provisions of section 16-11-204.5, C.R.S. In addition to 
any other penalty provided by law, the court may sentence a defendant to attend and pay for 
one appearance at a victim impact panel approved by the court, for which the fee assessed 
to the defendant shall not exceed twenty-five dollars. 
(i) (I) For the purposes of this subsection (9), "useful public service" means any work 
which is beneficial to the public and which involves a minimum of direct supervision or 
other public cost. "Useful public service" does not include any work which would endanger 
the health or safety of any person convicted of a violation of any of the offenses specified 
in subsection (1) or (2) of this section. 
(II) (A) The sentencing court, the probation department, the county sheriff, and the board 
of county commissioners shall cooperate in identifying suitable work assignments. An 
offender sentenced to such work assignment shall complete the same within the time 
established by the court. 
(B) There may be established in the probation department of each judicial district in the 
state a useful public service program under the direction of the chief probation officer. It is 
the purpose of the useful public service program: To identify and seek the cooperation of 
governmental entities and political subdivisions thereof, as well as corporations organized 
not for profit, for the purpose of providing useful public service jobs; to interview and 
assign persons who have been ordered by the court to perform useful public service to 
suitable useful public service jobs; and to monitor compliance or noncompliance of such 
persons in performing useful public service assignments within the time established by the 
court. 
(C) Any general public liability insurance policy obtained pursuant to this subsection (9) 
shall be in a sum of not less than the current limit on government liability under the 
"Colorado Governmental Immunity Act", article 10 of title 24, C.R.S. 
(III) For the purposes of the "Colorado Governmental Immunity Act", article 10 of title 
24, C.R.S., "public employee" does not include any person who is sentenced pursuant to this 
subsection (9) to participate in any type of useful public service. 
(IV) No governmental entity shall be liable under the "Workers' Compensation Act of 
Colorado", articles 40 to 47 of title 8, C.R.S., or under the "Colorado Employment Security 
Act", articles 70 to 82 of title 8, C.R.S., for any benefits on account of any person who is 
sentenced pursuant to this subsection (9) to participate in any type of useful public service, 
but nothing in this subparagraph (IV) shall prohibit a governmental entity from electing to 
accept the provisions of the "Workers' Compensation Act of Colorado" by purchasing and 
keeping in force a policy of workers' compensation insurance covering such person. 
(V) On and after July 1, 1984, in addition to any other penalties prescribed in this 
subsection (9), the court shall assess an amount, not to exceed sixty dollars, upon any person 
required to perform useful public service. Such amount shall be used by the operating 
agency responsible for overseeing such person's useful public service program to pay the 
cost of administration of the program, a general public liability policy covering such person, 
and, if such person will be covered by workers' compensation insurance pursuant to 
subparagraph (IV) of this paragraph (i) or an insurance policy providing such or similar 
coverage, the cost of purchasing and keeping in force such insurance coverage. Such amount 
shall be adjusted from time to time by the general assembly in order to insure that the useful 
public service program established in this subsection (9) shall be financially self-supporting. 
The proceeds from such amounts shall be used by the operating agency only for defraying 
the cost of personal services and other operating expenses related to the administration of 
the program and the cost of purchasing and keeping in force policies of general public 
liability insurance, workers' compensation insurance, or insurance providing such or similar 
coverage and shall not be used by the operating agency for any other purpose. 
(10) (a) The judicial department shall administer in each judicial district an alcohol and 
drug driving safety program that provides presentence and postsentence alcohol and drug 
evaluations on all persons convicted of a violation of subsection (1) or (2) of this section. 
The alcohol and drug driving safety program shall further provide supervision and 
monitoring of all such persons whose sentences or terms of probation require completion 
of a program of alcohol and drug driving safety education or treatment. 
(b) The presentence and postsentence alcohol and drug evaluations shall be conducted by 
such persons determined by the judicial department to be qualified to provide evaluation and 
supervision services as described in paragraph (c) of this subsection (10). 
(c) An alcohol and drug evaluation shall be conducted on all persons convicted of a 
violation of subsection (1) or (2) of this section, and a copy of the report of the evaluation 
shall be provided to such person. The report shall be made available to and shall be 
considered by the court prior to sentencing unless the court proceeds to immediate 
sentencing pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (e) of subsection (9) of this section. The 
report shall contain the defendant's prior traffic record, characteristics and history of alcohol 
or drug problems, and amenability to rehabilitation. The report shall include a 
recommendation as to alcohol and drug driving safety education or treatment for the 
defendant. The alcohol evaluation shall be conducted and the report prepared by a person 
who is trained and knowledgeable in the diagnosis of chemical dependency. Such person's 
duties may also include appearing at sentencing and probation hearings as required, referring 
defendants to education and treatment agencies in accordance with orders of the court, 
monitoring defendants in education and treatment programs, notifying the probation 
department and the court of any defendant failing to meet the conditions of probation or 
referral to education or treatment, appearing at revocation hearings as required, and 
providing assistance in data reporting and program evaluation. For the purpose of this 
subsection (10), "alcohol and drug driving safety education or treatment" means either level 
I or level II education or treatment programs that are approved by the division of alcohol and 
drug abuse. Level I programs are to be short-term, didactic education programs. Level II 
programs are to be therapeutically oriented education, long-term outpatient, and 
comprehensive residential programs. Any defendant sentenced to level I or level II programs 
shall be instructed by the court to meet all financial obligations of such programs. If such 
financial obligations are not met, the sentencing court shall be notified for the purpose of 
cllection or review and further action on the defendant's sentence. Nothing in this section 
shall prohibit treatment agencies from applying to the state for funds to recover the costs of 
level II treatment for defendants determined to be indigent by the court. 
(d) There is hereby created an alcohol and drug driving safety program fund in the office 
of the state treasurer to the credit of which shall be deposited all moneys as directed by this 
paragraph (d). In addition to any fines, fees, or costs levied against a person convicted of a 
violation of subsection (1) or (2) of this section, the judge shall assess each such person for 
the cost of the presentence or postsentence alcohol and drug evaluation and supervision 
services. The assessment in effect on July 1, 1998, shall remain in effect unless the judicial 
department and the division of alcohol and drug abuse have provided to the general 
assembly a statement of the cost of the program, including costs of administration for the 
past and current fiscal year to include a proposed change in the assessment. The general 
assembly shall then consider the proposed new assessment and approve the amount to be 
assessed against each person during the following fiscal year in order to ensure that the 
alcohol and drug driving safety program established in this subsection (10) shall be 
financially self-supporting. Any adjustment in the amount to be assessed shall be so noted 
in the appropriation to the judicial department and the division of alcohol and drug abuse 
as a footnote or line item related to this program in the general appropriation bill. The state 
auditor shall periodically audit the costs of the programs to determine that they are 
reasonable and that the rate charged is accurate based on these costs. Any other fines, fees, 
or costs levied against such person shall not be part of the program fund. The amount 
assessed for the alcohol and drug evaluation shall be transmitted by the court to the state 
treasurer to be credited to the alcohol and drug driving safety program fund. Fees charged 
under sections 25-1-306 (1), C.R.S., and 25-1-1102 (1), C.R.S., to approved alcohol and 
drug treatment facilities that provide level I and level II programs as provided in paragraph 
(c) of this subsection (10) shall be transmitted o the state treasurer, who shall credit the fees 
to the alcohol and drug driving safety program fund. Upon appropriation by the general 
assembly, these funds shall be expended by the judicial department and the division of 
alcohol and drug abuse for the administration of the alcohol and drug driving safety 
program. In administering the alcohol and drug driving safety program, the judicial 
department is authorized to contract with any agency for such services as the judicial 
department deems necessary. Moneys deposited in the alcohol and drug driving safety 
program fund shall remain in said fund to be used for the purposes set forth in this 
subsection (10) and shall not revert or transfer to the general fund except by further act of 
the general assembly. 
(e) The judicial department shall ensure that qualified personnel are placed in the judicial 
districts. The judicial department and the division of alcohol and drug abuse shall jointly 
develop and maintain criteria for evaluation techniques, treatment referral, data reporting, 
and program evaluation. 
(f) The alcohol and drug driving safety program shall cooperate in providing services to 
a defendant who resides in a judicial district other than the one in which the arrest was made. 
Alcohol and drug driving safety programs may cooperate in providing services to any 
defendant who resides at a location closer to another judicial district's program. The 
requirements of this subsection (10) shall not apply to persons who are not residents of 
Colorado at the time of sentencing. 
(g) The provisions of this subsection (10) are also applicable to any defendant who 
receives a deferred prosecution in accordance with section 16-7-401, C.R.S., or who 
receives a deferred sentence in accordance with section 16-7-403, C.R.S., and the 
completion of any stipulated alcohol evaluation, level I or level II education program, or 
level I or level II treatment program to be completed by the defendant shall be ordered by 
the court in accordance with the conditions of such deferred prosecution or deferred 
sentence as stipulated to by the prosecution and the defendant. 
(11) In all actions, suits, and judicial proceedings in any court of this state concerning 
alcohol-related or drug-related traffic offenses, the court shall take judicial notice of methods 
of testing a person's alcohol or drug level and of the design and operation of devices, as 
certified by the department of public health and environment, for testing a person's blood, 
breath, saliva, or urine to determine such person's alcohol or drug level. This subsection (11) 
shal 1 not prevent the necessity of establishing during a trial that the testing devices used were 
working properly and that such testing devices were properly operated. Nothing in this 
subsection (11) shall preclude a defendant from offering evidence concerning the accuracy 
of testing devices. 
(12) (Deleted by amendment, L. 95, p. 315, @ 3, effective July 1, 1995.) 
(13) As used in this section, "convicted" includes a plea of no contest accepted by the 
court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41 -6-44 (1999) 
41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or with specified or unsafe blood 
alcohol concentration - Measurement of blood or breath alcohol — Criminal punishment -
Arrest without warrant -- Penalties — Suspension or revocation of license 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "prior conviction" means any conviction for a violation of: 
(i) this section; 
(ii) alcohol-related reckless driving under Subsections (9) and (10); 
(iii) local ordinances similar to this section or alcohol-related reckless driving adopted 
in compliance with Section 41-6-43; 
(iv) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207; or 
(v) statutes or ordinances in effect in any other state, the United States, or any district, 
possession, or territory of the United States which would constitute a violation of this section 
or alcohol-related reckless driving if committed in this state, including punishments 
administered under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 815; 
(b) "serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes serious permanent 
disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, 
or creates a substantial risk of death; 
(c) a violation of this section includes a violation under a local ordinance similar to this 
section adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43; and 
(d) the standard of negligence is that of simple negligence, the failure to exercise that 
degree of care that an ordinarily reasonable and prudent person exercises under like or 
similar circumstances. 
(2) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle within this 
state if the person: 
(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a chemical test given within two hours of the 
alleged operation or physical control shows that the person has a blood or breath alcohol 
concentration of .08 grams or greater; or 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol 
and any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle. 
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has been legally 
entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any charge of violating this section. 
(c) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 100 
milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall be based upon grams of 
alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
(3) (a) A person convicted the first or second time of a violation of Subsection (2) is guilty 
of a: 
(i) class B misdemeanor; or 
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person: 
(A) has also inflicted bodily injury upon another as a proximate result of having 
operated the vehicle in a negligent manner; or 
(B) had a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the time of the offense. 
(b) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) is guilty of a third degree felony 
if the person has also inflicted serious bodily injury upon another as a proximate result of 
having operated the vehicle in a negligent manner. 
(4) (a) As part of any sentence imposed the court shall, upon a first conviction, impose a 
mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48 consecutive hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence, require the person to: 
(i) work in a compensatory-service work program for not less than 24 hours; or 
(ii) participate in home confinement through the use of electronic monitoring in 
accordance with Subsection (13). 
(c) In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-service work program, or home 
confinement, the court shall: 
(i) order the person to participate in an assessment and educational series at a licensed 
alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility, as appropriate; and 
(ii) impose a fine of not less than $700. 
(d) For a violation committed after July 1, 1993, the court may order the person to obtain 
treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility if the licensed alcohol or 
drug dependency rehabilitation facility determines that the person has a problem condition 
involving alcohol or drugs. 
(5) (a) If a person is convicted under Subsection (2) within six years of a prior conviction 
under this section, the court shall as part of any sentence impose a mandatory jail sentence 
of not less than 240 consecutive hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence, require the person to: 
(i) work in a compensatory-service work program for not less than 80 hours; or 
(ii) participate in home confinement through the use of electronic monitoring in 
accordance with Subsection (13). 
(c) In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-service work program, or home 
confinement, the court shall: 
(i) order the person to participate in an assessment and educational series at a licensed 
alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility, as appropriate; and 
(ii) impose a fine of not less than $800. 
(d) The court may order the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency 
rehabilitation facility. 
(6) (a) A third or subsequent conviction for a violation committed within six years of two 
or more prior convictions under this section is a third degree felony. 
(b) Under Subsection (3)(b) or (6)(a), if the court suspends the execution of a prison 
sentence and places the defendant on probation the court shall impose: 
(i) a fine of not less than $1,500; 
(ii) a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 1,000 hours; and 
(iii) an order requiring the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency 
rehabilitation program providing intensive care or inpatient treatment and long-term closely 
supervised follow-through after treatment. 
(c) In addition to the penalties required under Subsection (6)(c), the court may require 
the person to participate in home confinement through the use of electronic monitoring in 
accordance with Subsection (13). 
(7) (a) The mandatory portion of any sentence required under this section may not be 
suspended and the convicted person is not eligible for parole or probation until any sentence 
imposed under this section has been served. Probation or parole resulting from a conviction 
for a violation under this section may not be terminated. 
(b) The department may not reinstate any license suspended or revoked as a result of the 
conviction under this section, until the convicted person has furnished evidence satisfactory 
to the department that: 
(i) all required alcohol or drug dependency assessment, education, treatment, and 
rehabilitation ordered for a violation committed after July 1, 1993, have been completed; 
(ii) all fines and fees including fees for restitution and rehabilitation costs assessed 
against the person have been paid, if the conviction is a second or subsequent conviction for 
a violation committed within six years of a prior violation; and 
(iii) the person does not use drugs in any abusive or illegal manner as certified by a 
licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility, if the conviction is for a third or 
subsequent conviction for a violation committed within six years of two prior violations 
committed after July 1, 1993. 
(8) (a) (i) The provisions in Subsections (4), (5), and (6) that require a sentencing court to 
order a convicted person to: participate in an assessment and educational series at a licensed 
alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility; obtain, in the discretion of the court, 
treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility; obtain, mandatorily, 
treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility; or do a combination of 
those things, apply to a conviction for a violation of Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 under 
Subsection (9). 
(ii) The court shall render the same order regarding education or treatment at an 
alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility, or both, in connection with a first, second, 
or subsequent conviction under Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 under Subsection (9), as the 
court would render in connection with applying respectively, the first, second, or subsequent 
conviction requirements of Subsections (4), (5), and (6). 
(b) Any alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation program and any community-based 
or other education program provided for in this section shall be approved by the Department 
of Human Services. 
(9) (a) (i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or no contest to a charge of a 
violation of Section 41-6-45, of an ordinance enacted under Section 41-6-43, or of Section 
41-6-44.6 in satisfaction of, or as a substitute for, an original charge of a violation of this 
section, the prosecution shall state for the record a factual basis for the plea, including 
whether or not there had been consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both, by 
the defendant in connection with the violation. 
(ii) The statement is an offer of proof of the facts that shows whether there was 
consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant, in connection 
with the violation. 
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before accepting the plea offered under this 
Subsection (9)(b) of the consequences of a violation of Section 41-6-44.6 or of Section 
41-6-45. 
(c) The court shall notify the department of each conviction of Section 41-6-44.6 or 
41-6-45 entered under this Subsection (9). 
(10) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation of this section 
when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation has occurred, although not in 
his presence, and if the officer has probable cause to believe that the violation was 
committed by the person. 
(11) (a) The Department of Public Safety shall: 
(i) suspend for 90 days me operator's license of a person convicted for the first time 
under Subsection (2); 
(ii) revoke for one year the license of a person convicted of any subsequent offense 
under Subsection (2) if the violation is committed within a period of six years from the date 
of the prior violation; and 
(iii) suspend or revoke the license of a person as ordered by the court under Subsection 
(12). 
(b) The department shall subtract from any suspension or revocation period the number 
of days for which a license was previously suspended under Section 53-3-223 or 53-3-231, 
if the previous suspension was based on the same occurrence upon which the record of 
conviction is based. 
(12) (a) In addition to any other penalties provided in this section, a court may order the 
operator's license of a person who is convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) to be 
suspended or revoked for an additional period of 90 days, 180 days, or one year to remove 
from the highways those persons who have shown they are safety hazards. 
(b) If the court suspends or revokes the person's license under this Subsection (12)(b), 
the court shall prepare and send to the Driver License Division of the Department of Public 
Safety an order to suspend or revoke that person's driving privileges for a specified period 
of time. 
(13) (a) If the court orders a person to participate in home confinement through the use of 
electronic monitoring, the electronic monitoring shall alert the appropriate corrections, 
probation monitoring agency, Jaw enforcement units, or contract provider of the defendant's 
whereabouts. 
(b) The electronic monitofing device shall be used under conditions which require: 
(i) the person to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times; 
(ii) that a device be placed in the home or other specified location of the person, so that 
the person's compliance with the court's order may be monitored; and 
(iii) the person to pay tne costs of the electronic monitoring. 
(c) The court shall order the appropriate entity described in Subsection (e) to place an 
electronic monitoring device on the person and install electronic monitoring equipment in 
the residence of the person or other specified location. 
(d) The court may: 
(i) require the person's electronic home monitoring device to include an alcohol 
detection breathalyzer; 
(ii) restrict the amount of alcohol the person may consume during the time the person 
is Subject to home confinement; 
(iii) set specific time and location conditions that allow the person to attend school 
educational classes, or employment and to travel directly between those activities and the 
person's home; and 
(iv) waive all or part of the costs associated with home confinement if the person is 
determined to be indigent by the court. 
(e) The electronic monitoring described in this section may either be administered 
directly by the appropriate corrections agency, probation monitoring agency, or by contract 
with a private provider. 
(jf) The electronic monitoring provider shall cover the costs of waivers by the court under 
Subsection (13)(c)(iv). 
Utah Code Ann. § 41 -6-44.6 (1999) 
41-6-44.6. Definitions — Driving with any measurable controlled substance in the body -
Penalties - Arrest without warrant 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Controlled substance" means any substance scheduled under Section 58-37-4. 
•(b) "Practitioner" has the same meaning as provided in Section 58-37-2. 
(c) "Prescribe" has the same meaning as provided in Section 58-37-2. 
(d) "Prescription" has the Same meaning as provided in Section 58-37-2. 
(2) In cases not amounting to a violation of Section 41-6-44, a person may not operate or 
be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle within this state if the person has any 
measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's body. 
(3) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section that the controlled 
substance was involuntarily ingested by the accused or prescribed by a practitioner for use 
by the accused. 
(4) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
(5) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation of this section 
when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation has occurred, although not in 
the officer's presence, and if the officer has probable cause to believe that the violation was 
committed by the person. 
(6) The Driver License Division shall: 
(a) suspend, for 90 days, the driver license of a person convicted under Subsection (2); 
(b) revoke, for one year, the driver license of a person convicted of a second or 
subsequent offense under Subsection (2) if the violation is committed within a period of six 
years after the date of the prior violation; and 
(c) subtract from any suspension or revocation period the number of days for which a 
license was previously suspended under Section 53-3-223 or 53-3-231, if the previous 
suspension was based on the same occurrence upon which the record of conviction is based. 
(7) The Driver License Division may not reinstate any license suspended or revoked as a 
result of a conviction under this section, until the convicted person has complied with the 
requirements of Subsection 41-6-44(7)(b). 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (1999) 
41-6-44.10. Implied consent to chemical tests for alcohol or drug - Number of tests -
Refusal - Warning, report - Hearing, revocation of license - Appeal - Person incapable 
of refusal - Results of test available - Who may give test - Evidence 
(1) (a) A person operating a motor vehicle in this state is considered to have given his 
consent to a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine for the purpose of 
determining whether he was operating or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while 
having a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited under Section 41-6-44, 
53-3-231, or 53-3-232, while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of 
alcohol and any drug under Section 41-6-44, or while having any measurable controlled 
substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's body in violation of Section 
41-6-44.6, if the test is or tests are administered at the direction of a peace officer having 
grounds to believe that person to have been operating or in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle while having a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited under Section 
41-6-44, 53-3-231, or 53-3-232, or while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or 
combination of alcohol and any drug under Section 41 -6-44, or while having any measurable 
controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's body in violation 
of Section 41-6-44.6. 
(b) (i) The peace officer determines which of the tests are administered and how many 
of them are administered. 
(ii) If an officer requests more than one test, refusal by a person to take one or more 
requested tests, even though he does submit to any other requested test or tests, is a refusal 
under this section. 
(c) (i) A person who has been requested under this section to submit to a chemical test 
or tests of his breath, blood, or urine, may not select the test or tests to be administered. 
(ii) The failure or inability of a peace officer to arrange for any specific chemical test 
is not a defense to taking a test requested by a peace officer, and it is not a defense in any 
criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding resulting from a person's refusal to submit to 
the requested test or tests. 
(2) (a) If the person has been placed under arrest, has then been requested by a peace 
officer to submit to any one or more of the chemical tests under Subsection (1), and refuses 
to submit to any chemical test requested, the person shall be warned by the peace officer 
requesting the test or tests that a refusal to submit to the test or tests can result in revocation 
of the person's license to operate a motor vehicle. 
(b) Following the warning under Subsection (a), if the person does not immediately 
request that the chemical test or tests as offered by a peace officer be administered a peace 
officer shall serve on the person, on behalf of the Driver License Division, immediate notice 
of the Driver License Division's intention to revoke the person's privilege or license to 
operate a motor vehicle. When the officer serves the immediate notice on behalf of the 
Driver License Division, he shall: 
(i) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of the operator; 
(ii) issue a temporary license effective for only 29 days; and 
(iii) supply to the operator, on a form approved by the Driver License Division, basic 
information regarding how to obtain a hearing before the Driver License Division. 
(c) A citation issued by a peace officer may, if approved as to form by the Driver License 
Division, serve also as the temporary license. 
(d) As a matter of procedure, the peace officer shall submit a signed report, within ten 
days after the date of the arrest, that he had grounds to believe the arrested person had been 
operating or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or breath 
alcohol content statutorily prohibited under Section 41-6-44, 53-3-231, or 53-3-232, or 
while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug 
under Section 41-6-44, or while having any measurable controlled substance or metabolite 
of a controlled substance in the person's body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6, and that the 
person had refused to submit to a chemical test or tests under Subsection (1). 
(e) (i) A person who has been notified of the Driver License Division's intention to 
revoke his license under this section is entitled to a hearing. 
(ii) A request for the heaf ing shall be made in writing within ten days after the date of 
the arrest. 
(iii) Upon written request, the division shall grant to the person an opportunity to be 
heard within 29 days after the date of arrest. 
(iv) If the person does not make a timely written request for a hearing before the 
division, his privilege to operate a motor vehicle in the state is revoked beginning on the 
30th day after the date of arrest for a period of: 
(A) one year unless Subsection (2)(e)(iv)(B) applies; or 
(B) 18 months if the person has had a previous license sanction after July L 1993, 
under this section, Section 41-6-44.6, 53-3-223, 53-3-231, 53-3-232, or a conviction after 
July 1, 1993, under Section 41-6-44. 
(f) If a hearing is requested by the person, the hearing shall be conducted by the Driver 
License Division in the county in which the offense occurred, unless the division and the 
person both agree that the hearing may be held in some other county. 
(g) The hearing shall be documented and shall cover the issues of: 
(i) whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe that a person was 
operating a motor vehicle in violation of Section 41-6-44, 41-6-44.6, or 53-3-231; and 
(ii) whether the person refused to submit to the test. 
(h) (i) In connection with the hearing, the division or its authorized agent: 
(A) may administer oaths and may issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses 
and the production of relevant books and papers; and 
(B) shall issue subpoenas for the attendance of necessary peace officers. 
(ii) The division shall pay witness fees and mileage from the Transportation Fund in 
accordance with the rates established in Section 21-5-4. 
(i) If after a hearing, the Driver License Division determines that the person was 
requested to submit to a chemical test or tests and refused to submit to the test or tests, or if 
the person fails to appear before the Driver License Division as required in the notice, the 
Driver License Division shall revoke his license or permit to operate a motor vehicle in Utah 
beginning on the date the hearing is held for a period of. 
(i) (A) one year unless Subsection (2)(i)(i)(B) applies; or 
(B) 18 months if the person has had a previous license sanction after July 1, 1993, 
under this section, Section 41-6-44.6, 53-3-223, 53-3-231, 53-3-232, or a conviction after 
July 1, 1993, under Section 41-6-44. 
(ii) The Driver License Division shall also assess against the person, in addition to any 
fee imposed under Subsection 53-3-205(14), a fee under Section 53-3-105, which shall be 
paid before the person's driving privilege is reinstated, to cover administrative costs. 
(iii) The fee shall be cancelled if the person obtains an unappealed court decision 
following a proceeding allowed under this Subsection (2) that the revocation was improper. 
(j) (i) Any person whose license has been revoked by the Driver License Division under 
this section may seek judicial review. 
(ii) Judicial review of an informal adjudicative proceeding is a trial. Venue is in the 
district court in the county in which the offense occurred. 
3) Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other condition rendering him 
incapable of refusal to submit to any chemical test or tests is considered to not have 
withdrawn the consent provided for in Subsection (1), and the test or tests may be 
administered whether the person has been arrested or not. 
(4) Upon the request of the person who was tested, the results of the test or tests shall be 
made available to him. 
(5) (a) Only a physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person authorized under 
Section 26-1-30, acting at the request of a peace officer, may withdraw blood to determine 
the alcoholic or drug content. This limitation does not apply to taking a urine or breath 
specimen. 
(b) Any physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person authorized under Section 
26-1-30 who, at the direction of a peace officer, draws a sample of blood from any person 
whom a peace officer has reason to believe is driving in violation of this chapter, or hospital 
or medical facility at which the sample is drawn, is immune from any civil or criminal 
liability arising from drawing the sample, if the test is administered according to standard 
medical practice. 
(6) (a) The person to be tested may, at his own expense, have a physician of his own 
choice administer a chemical test in addition to the test or tests administered at the direction 
of a peace officer. 
(b) The failure or inability to obtain the additional test does not affect admissibility of 
the results of the test or tests taken at the direction of a peace officer, or preclude or delay 
the test or tests to be taken at the direction of a peace officer. 
(c) The additional test shall be subsequent to the test or tests administered at the direction 
of a peace officer. 
(7) For the purpose of determining whether to submit to a chemical test or tests, the person 
to be tested does not have the right to consult an attorney or have an attorney, physician, or 
other person present as a condition for the taking of any test. 
(8) If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a chemical test or tests or any additional 
test under this section, evidence of any refusal is admissible in any civil or criminal action 
or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have been committed while the person was 
operating or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol, any drug, combination of alcohol and any drug, or while having any measurable 
controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's body. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-45 (1999) 
41-6-45. Reckless driving - Penalty 
(\) A person who operates any vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of 
persons or property is guilty of reckless driving. 
(2) A person convicted of reckless driving is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Upon a first 
conviction, the penalty is a minimum term of imprisonment of not fewer than five days, or 
a minimum fine of not less than $25. On a second or subsequent conviction, the penalty is 
a minimum term of imprisonment of not fewer than ten days, or a minimum fine of not less 
than $50. 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 (pre-November 1999 amended version) 
Rule 29. Disability and disqualification of a judge or change of venue. 
(a) If, by reason of death, sickness, or other disability, the judge before whom a trial has 
begun is unable to continue with the trial, any other judge of that court or any judge assigned 
by the presiding officer of the Judicial Council, upon certifying that he has familiarized 
himself with the record of the trial may, unless otherwise disqualified, proceed with and 
finish the trial, but if the assigned judge is satisfied that neither he nor another substitute 
judge can proceed with the trial, he may, in his discretion, grant a new trial. 
(b) If, by reason of death, sickness, or other disability, the judge before whom a defendant 
has been tried is unable to perform the duties required of the court after a verdict of guilty, 
any other judge of that court or any judge assigned by the presiding officer of the Judicial 
Council may perform those duties. 
(c) If the prosecution or a defendant in any criminal action or proceeding files an affidavit 
that the judge before whom the action or proceeding is to be tried or heard has a bias or 
prejudice, either against the party or his attorney or in favor of any opposing party to the suit, 
the judge shall proceed no further until the challenge is disposed of Every affidavit shall 
state the facts and the reasons for the belief that the bias or prejudice exists and shall be filed 
as soon as practicable after the case has been assigned or the bias or prejudice is known. No 
affidavit may be filed unless accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record that the 
affidavit and application are made in good faith. 
(d) If the challenged judge questions the sufficiency of the allegation of disqualification, 
he shall enter an order directing that a copy be forthwith certified to another named judge 
of the same court or of a court of like jurisdiction, which judge shall then pass upon the legal 
sufficiency of the allegations. I f the challenged judge does not question the legal sufficiency 
of the affidavit, or if the judge to whom the affidavit is certified finds that it is legally 
sufficient, another judge shall be called to try the case or to conduct the proceeding. If the 
judge to whom the affidavit is certified does not find the affidavit to be legally sufficient, 
he shall enter a finding to that effect and the challenged judge shall proceed with the case 
or proceeding. 
(e) If the prosecution or a defendant in a criminal action believes that a fair and impartial 
trial cannot be had in the jurisdiction where the action is pending, either may, by motion, 
supported by an affidavit setting forth facts, ask to have the trial of the case transferred to 
another jurisdiction. 
(ii) If the court is satisfied that the representations made in the affidavit are true and justify 
transfer of the case, the court shall enter an order for the removal of the case to the court of 
another jurisdiction free from the objection and all records pertaining to the case shall be 
transferred forthwith to the court in the other county. If the court is not satisfied that the 
representations so made justify transfer of the case, the court shall either enter an order 
denying the transfer or order a formal hearing in court to resolve the matter and receive 
further evidence with respect to the alleged prejudice. 
(f) When a change of judge or place of trial is ordered all documents of record concerning 
the case shall be transferred without delay to the judge who shall hear the case. 
Ut^h Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 (2000) 
Rule 29. Disability and disqualification of a judge or change of venue. 
(a) If, by reason of death, sicKness, or other disability, the judge before whom a trial has 
begun is 
unable to continue with the trial, any other judge of that court or any judge assigned by the 
presiding officer of the Judicial Council, upon certifying that the judge is familiar with the 
record of 
the trial, may, unless otherwise disqualified, proceed with and finish the trial, but if the 
assigned 
judge is satisfied that neither lie nor another substitute judge can proceed with the trial, the 
judge 
may, in his discretion, grant a new trial. 
(b) If, by reason of death, sickness, or other disability, the judge before whom a defendant 
ha^ 
been tried is unable to perform the duties required of the court after a verdict of guilty, any 
other 
judge of that court or any judge assigned by the presiding officer of the Judicial Council may 
perform those duties. 
(c)( 1)(A) A party to any action or the party's attorney may file a motion to disqualify a judge. 
The 
motion shall be accompanied by a certificate that the motion is filed in good faith and shall 
be 
supported by an affidavit stating facts sufficient to si io> v bias 01 preji idice, 01 :o.t ifli :t c >f 
interest. 
(B) The motion shall be filed after commencement of the action, but not later than 20 days 
after 
the last of the following: 
(i) assignment. ::i«i t l ic action or hearing to the ji ldge; 
(ii) appearance of the party or the party's attorney; or 
(iii) the date on which the moving party learns or with the exercise of reasonable diligence 
should 
have learned of the grounds upon which the motion is based. 
If the last event occurs fewer than 20 days prioi to a hearing : i v ?»•-.- -••>• ••*»"• 1 as 
soon as 
practicable. 
(C) Signing the motion or affidavit constitutes a certificate under RuK 11 Utah Rules of 
Civil 
Procedure and subjects the party or attorney to the procedures and sanctions of Rule 11 No 
party may file more than one motion to disqualify in an action. 
(2) The judge against whom the motion and affidavit are directed shall, without iuither 
hearing, 
enter an order granting the motion or certifying the motion and affidavit to a reviewing 
judge. If the 
judge grants the motion, the order shall direct the presiding judge of the court or, if the court 
has 
no presiding judge, the presiding officer of the ludicial Council to assign anotherjudge to 
the 
action or hearing. The presiding judge of the court, any judge of the district, any judge of 
a court 
of like jurisdiction, or the presiding officer of the Judicial Council may serve as the 
reviewing 
judge. 
(3)(A) If the reviewing judge finds that th . motion and affidavit are tii nely filed. Ill* xl ir i 
good faith 
and legally sufficient, the reviewing judge shall assign another judge to the action or hearing 
or 
request the presiding judge or the presiding officer o*' •'• ^ so. 
(B) In determining issues of fact or of law, the reviewing judge may consider any part of the 
record of the action and may request of the judge who is the subject of the motion and 
affidavit an 
affidavit responsive to questions posed by the reviewing judge. 
(C) The reviewing judge may deny a motion not filed in a tii i lely 1 i lai iner. 
(d) (i) 11the prosecution or a defendant in a criminal acuon believes thai -•';- - -Mpai ual 
trial 
cannot be had iii the jurisdiction where the action is pending, either may, by motion, 
supported by 
an affidavit setting forth facts, ask to have the trial of the case transferred to another 
jurisdiction. 
(ii) If the court is satisfied that the representations made in the alTida\ ii ;nv true iind justify 
transfer 
of the case, the court shall enter an order for the removal of the case to the court of another 
jurisdiction free from the objection and all records pertaining to the case shall be transferred 
forthwith to the court in the other county. If the court is not satisfied that the representations 
so 
made justify' transfer of the case, the court shall either enter an order denying the transfer or 
order 
a formal hearing in court to resolve the matter and receive further evidence with respect to 
the 
alleged prejudice. 
(e) When a change of judge or place of trial is ordered all documents of record concerning 
the 
case shall be transferred witl lelav to the judge who shall hear the case. 
Utah Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3 
Canon 3. A judge shall perform the duties of the office impartially and diligently. 
A. Judicial duties in general. The judicial duties of a full-time judge take precedence over 
all the judge's other activities. The judge's judicial duties include all the duties of the judge's 
office prescribed by law. In the performance of these duties, the following standards apply. 
B. Adjudicative responsibilities. 
(1) A judge shall hear and decide matters assigned to the judge except those in which 
disqualification is required or permitted by rule, or transfer to another court occui s. 
(2) A judge shall apply the law and maintain professional competence. A judge shall not 
be swayed by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of criticism. 
(3) A judge should maintain order and decorum in proceedings before the judge. 
(4) A judge shall be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, 
lawyers, and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity, and should require 
similar conduct of lawyers, and of staff, court officials, and others subject to judicial 
direction and control. 
(5) A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice. A judge shall not, in 
the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice, including 
but not limited to bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, 
age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, and should not permit, and shall use all 
reasonable efforts to deter, staff, court officials and others subject to judicial direction and 
control from doing so. A judge should be alert to avoid behavior that may be perceived as 
prejudicial. 
(6) A judge should require lawyers in proceedings before the judge to refrain from 
manifesting, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national 
origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, against parties, witnesses, 
counsel or others. This Canon does not preclude legitimate advocacy when race, sex, 
religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, or other 
similar factors, are issues in the proceeding. 
(7) A judge shall accord to every person who is legally interested in a proceeding, or that 
person's lawyer, full right to be heard according to law. Except as authorized by law, a judge 
shall neither initiate nor consider, and shall discourage, ex parte or other communications 
concerning a pending or impending proceeding. A judge may consult with the court 
personnel whose function is to aid the judge in carrying out the judge's adjudicative 
responsibilities or with other judges provided that the judge does not abrogate the 
responsibility to personally decide the case pending before the court. No communication 
respecting a pending or impending proceeding shall occur between the trial judge ami tin 
appellate court unless a copy of any written communication or the substance of any oral 
communication is provided to all parties. A judge may obtain the advice of a disinterested 
expert on the law applicable to a proceeding before the court if the judge gives notice to the 
parties of the person consulted and the substance of the advice, and affords the parties 
reasonable opportunity to respond. A judge may, with the consent of the parties either in 
writing or on the record, confer separately with the parties and their lawyers in an effort to 
mediate or settle matters pending before the judge. 
(8) A judge shall dispose of all judicial matters promptly, efficiently, and fairly. 
(9) A judge shall not, while a proceeding is pending or impending in any court, make any 
public comment that might reasonably be expected to affect its outcome or impair its fairness 
or make any nonpublic comment that might substantially interfere with a fair trial or hearing. 
A judge should require similar abstention on the part of court personnel subject to judicial 
direction and control. This Canon does not prohibit a judge from making public statements 
in the course of official duties or from explaining for public information the procedures of 
the court. This Canon does not apply to proceedings in which a judge is a litigant in a 
personal capacity. 
(10) A judge shall not commend or criticize jurors for their verdict other than in a court 
order or opinion in a proceeding but may express appreciation to jurors for their service to 
the judicial system and the community. 
(11) A judge shall not disclose or use, for purposes unrelated to judicial duties, 
information acquired in a judicial capacity that is not available to the public. 
C. Administrative responsibilities. 
(1) A judge shall diligently discharge the judge's administrative responsibilities without 
bias or prejudice, maintain professional competence injudicial administration, and cooperate 
with other judges and court officials in the administration of court business. 
(2) A judge should require staff, court officials and others subject to judicial direction and 
control to observe the standards of fidelity and diligence that apply to the judge and to 
refrain from manifesting bias or prejudice in the performance of their official duties. 
(3) A judge with supervisory authority for the judicial performance of other judges should 
take reasonable measures to assure the prompt disposition of matters before them and the 
proper performance of their other judicial responsibilities. 
(4) A judge shall not make unnecessary appointments, shall exercise the power of 
appointment impartially and on the basis of merit, and shall avoid nepotism and favoritism. 
A judge shall not approve compensation of appointees beyond the fair value of services 
rendered. 
D. Disciplinary responsibilities. A judge should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary 
measures against a judge or lawyer for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may 
become aware. This section does not apply to information generated and communicated 
under the policies of the Judicial Performance Evaluation Program. 
E. Disqualification. 
(1) A judge shall enter a disqualification in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality 
might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where: 
(a) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party's lawyer, a 
strong personal bias involving an issue in a case, or personal knowledge of disputed 
evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding; 
(b) the judge had served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, had practiced law with 
a lawyer who had served in the matter at the time of their association, or the judge or such 
lawyer has been a material witness concerning it; 
(c) the judge knows that the judge, individually or as a fiduciary, or the judge's spouse, 
parent or child wherever residing, or any other member of the judge's family residing in the 
judge's household, has an economic interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party 
to the proceeding, or has any other more than de minimis interest that could be substantially 
affected by the proceeding; 
(d) the judge or the judge's spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to 
either of them, or the spouse of such a person: 
(i) is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party; 
(ii) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; 
(iii) is known by the judge to have a more than de minimis interest that could be 
substantially affected by the proceeding; 
(iv) is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in tlle proceeding. 
(2) A judge shall keep informed about the judge's personal and fiduciary economic 
interests, and should make a reasonable effort to keep informed about the personal economic 
interests of the judge's spouse and minor children residing in the judge's household. 
F. Remittal of disqualification. A judge disqualified by the terms of Canon 3E may 
disclose the basis of the judge's disqualification and ask the parties and their lawyers to 
consider, out of the presence of the judge, whether to waive disqualification. If following 
disclosure of any basis for disqualification other than personal bias or prejudice concerning 
a part}, the parties and lawyers, without participation by the judge, all agree that the judge 
need not be disqualified, and the judge is then willing to participate, the judge may 
participate in the proceeding. The agreement shall be entered on the record, or if written, 
filed in the case file. 
